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ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation addresses three overarching research questions: 1) Given the 
differences in institutional logics that underlie organizations that are based on a state 
logic or a market logic (i.e.,focused on compliance with minimum regulatory 
requirements versus maximizing profit), why are organizations based on one logic more 
likely to enter a market than the other? 2) How does the hybridization of both logics 
influence market entry decisions? 3) How do values instantiated within the surrounding 
geographical community influence market entry by organizations based on one logic or 
the other? While much of the literature on institutional entrepreneurship has focused on 
market entry actions by market-logic based organizations, I develop and test theory 
about how state logic based organizations enter the renewable energy generation market.  
In doing so, I contribute to the institutional logics literature by helping clarify the 
mechanisms by which a state logic influences organizational entrepreneurship. I also 
contribute to theory by looking at the influence of public-private partnerships, 
organizational size, and community-level political ideology on market entry and risk-
taking. This study uses a unique dataset on over 2,400 landfills in the United States from 
the years between 1970 and 2014. Data have been gathered at the state, community, 
organization, and project level for each landfill in the population. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
How do public sector organizations that are based on a state logic pursue 
entrepreneurial opportunities? Past research on institutions and entrepreneurship has 
typically focused on the influence of the state as a regulatory influence, showing how the 
state and other aspects of the institutional environment can influence entrepreneurial 
practices and outcomes by determining the legitimacy of organizational forms and 
practices, as well as by influencing the amount of resources available for new ventures 
(Thébaud, 2015; Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). This research largely views the state as 
an institutional- or field-level influence or logic, rather than as a key actor (e.g., Ault & 
Spicer, 2014). For example, one stream of research looks at how the state influences 
entrepreneurship via regulatory mechanisms such as tax credits and subsidies that have 
been shown to lower barriers to entry (Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). This stream 
has found that the state influences risk-taking behaviors by organizations pursuing 
markets in new countries (García‐Canal & Guillén, 2008). Others have shown how 
entrepreneurs can proactively influence regulatory policy making (Hiatt & Park, 2013), 
as well as how regulatory discretion allows incumbents to influence applicable 
regulatory policies such that new market entrants face greater barriers (Grandy, 2017).  
Such a view of the state as an institutional influence on entrepreneurship is 
limited in that it fails to consider that the state may itself be the entrepreneur. Public 
sector organizations such as cities, towns, counties, and federal agencies have a 
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tremendous impact not only on the economy1, but are often faced with decisions of when 
and how to enter new markets that may allow them to better serve their constituency. 
State logic based organizations (SLOs) often enter new markets as they add additional 
services such as drinking water, sewer, recreation, mass transit, and power generation. 
These organizations have a fundamentally different logic underlying their values and 
beliefs than market logic based organizations (MLOs) (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 
2012). The inherent differences stemming from their different logics may result in 
significantly different actions and outcomes by these organizations, even when faced 
with similar opportunities, including when and how these organizations enter new 
markets. Understanding the potential influences that state logics have on entrepreneurial 
actions and outcomes is an important step in better understanding the implications of 
state logics, which include public sector organizations (Boyne, 2002; Bozeman, 2013; 
Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017; Kelman, 2007; Perry & Rainey, 1988). In this study, I 
focus on the type of organization because it allows for a better understanding of the 
underlying organizational-level logics than a focus on the organization’s identity 
(Pahnke, Katila, & Eisenhardt, 2015). 
This study draws on the institutional logics framework to develop theory on why 
and how SLOs enter new markets, including the degree of risk they take as they enter the 
market, and the ultimate survival of the venture. The logics perspective is centered on 
                                                 
1 According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are over 22 million government employees at the 
local (e.g., city and county), state, and federal government levels in the U.S. (Statistics, 2017). These 
organizations spend an amount equal to approximately 37% of the U.S. gross domestic product (OECD, 
2017). 
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understanding the processes and mechanisms by which organizational behavior is 
influenced by the underlying values and beliefs of the individuals and organization 
(Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional logics provide the guiding principles of society 
through which actors can interpret their situations and know what is appropriate 
behavior (Thornton, 2004: pg 70). In other words, they are “socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, 
and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: pg 804). Logics 
thus provide a cognitive framework that helps organizations understand which beliefs, 
values, goals, and behavior are legitimate and thus should receive the organization’s 
attention. 
My dissertation addresses three overarching research questions: 1) Given the 
differences in institutional logics that underlie organizations that are based on a state 
logic or a market logic (i.e., focused on compliance with minimum regulatory 
requirements versus maximizing profit), why are organizations based on one logic more 
likely to enter a market than the other?, 2) How does the hybridization of both logics 
influence market entry decisions?. and 3) How do values instantiated within the 
surrounding geographical community influence market entry by organizations based on 
one logic or the other? By clarifying how market entry is influenced by public sector 
organizations who subscribe to a state logic, I contribute to the institutional logics 
literature by identifying the factors that influence when SLOs likelihood of entering a 
new market. At the same time, those who do enter the market are more likely to take risk 
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as they enter the market. While there is a significant literature on firm ownership, few 
have looked at how primary ownership by an SLO influences firm actions (Xia & 
Walker, 2015).  
Ignoring the differences between SLOs and MLOs is a significant issue for 
several reasons. First, in many cities in the U.S., government organizations employ a 
large percentage of the population (Bureau, 2015). Examples of industries where SLOs 
are a popular alternative to MLOs include communications, drinking water and 
wastewater, education, electricity, transportation (e.g., roadways, subway, bus, and 
ferry), hospital and ambulance services, and even solid waste disposal services.  
Second, the lack of distinction between SLOs and MLOs has the potential to lead 
to theoretical overgeneralization as well (Meyer, 1979), because the two sectors have 
important differences in their structure, environment, resource dependencies, and 
incentives (Perry & Rainey, 1988). For example, ownership rights in SLOs cannot 
typically be transferred between individual actors, meaning that risk from a property 
rights perspective is highly diffused (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Demsetz, 2000). 
Because contracts are difficult to construct, an MLO has incentives to reduce costs 
without concern for quality (Hart, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). From a public choice 
perspective, monopolizing a public service allows politicians and bureaucrats to extract 
rents and power, leading to inefficiency (Savas, 1987). There are also differences 
stemming from a transaction costs perspective as privatization can provide a cost savings 
in cases where the transaction costs (due to asset specificity or monitoring) are not 
overly large (Williamson, 1979). Understanding the implications of organizational-level 
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state vs market logics on firm outcomes such as market entry and risk-taking is therefore 
of significant importance. The state logic does not operate solely at the societal or 
community-level (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015), but is also instantiated within SLOs, who 
have a tremendous influence on the economy, not only through the services they 
provide, but also through responding to the demands of their constituencies.  
In theorizing about the implications of public-private partnerships, I extend the 
findings of past research that suggests that logic multiplicity between public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) can influence organizational outcomes (Jay, 2013). By shedding 
light on the ways in which both state and market logics interact in a PPP to influence 
market entry and risk-taking, I show how the rate of market entry and risk-taking by an 
SLO are moderated by a partnership with an MLO. Understanding how different logics 
interact within a partnership allows a better understanding of how to address and manage 
potentially conflicting situations that are increasingly arising as organizations look for 
new forms in order to better address the complex environments in which they are 
situated (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Further, PPPs are increasingly being used by SLOs as a 
means to engage in projects and services that they normally would be unable to 
accomplish. Such partnerships provide a unique case where market logics are in essence 
invading SLOs. While prior work has considered how market logics can be pulled in by 
SLOs, the context has typically been limited to countries transitioning to a market-based 
economy, where the state has a great deal of control (e.g., China). By studying how 
market logics can influence SLOs in a mature, established market-based economy like 
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the United States, I help shed light on how such partnerships influence important 
organizational outcomes.  
The third contribution of this dissertation comes through showing how political 
ideology at the community-level influences organizational strategies differentially 
depending on which whether the organization is based on a state or market logic. 
Linking community values to the way that logics are instantiated within organizations 
helps build theory on how values are internalized by organizations. This is an important 
extension of the existing logics literature, and is contrary to past work in neo-
institutional theory (e.g., Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) and the sociology of culture (e.g., 
Swidler, 1986), which both focused on how values were cleansed from organizations. By 
theorizing and testing how community values (i.e. political ideology) are internalized to 
varying degrees by organizations based on different logics, I contribute to the rapidly 
growing literature focused on bringing values back into organizational-level studies 
(Almandoz, 2014; Besharov & Smith, 2014). In this dissertation, I theorize about how 
political ideology at the community-level is an explicit representation of the underlying 
values and beliefs in the community, which can directly influence organizations within 
those communities. While logics are the underlying values, beliefs and identity, 
ideologies are explicit and conscious representations of the underlying logics that 
connect both material and symbolic elements to social identities and positions 
(Delmestri, 2009). In other words, ideologies are “the institutionalized interest-laden 
glue justifying material practices through, and connecting them to, the symbolic 
constructions that make up institutional logics” (Delmestri, 2009: 117). While prior 
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research has often used ideology at the individual level (Almandoz, 2014), I show how 
ideology at the community-level can influence organizations that are particularly open to 
stakeholder influence, which can lead to changes in the way these organizations enter 
new markets. Understanding how community-level logics not only filter higher order 
logics (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015), but also how they interact with organizational-level 
logics helps to provide a deeper understanding of how heterogeneity can occur between 
organizations based on the same logic, as well as clarifying how such values are 
internalized into different organizations. Such a view of internalized values also helps us 
to better understand their subsequent influence on important firm outcomes.  
Fourth, as concerns about climate change, employee treatment, and other critical 
issues continue to grow in number and seriousness, management scholars have typically 
assumed that MLOs should lead the way in addressing these critical environmental and 
social issues, while relegating the role of SLO to that of policy setting and regulatory 
enforcement. However, SLOs not only can be part of the issue (e.g., they can have a 
large carbon footprint or mistreat employees), but they can also have a profound 
influence on addressing these solutions. By studying the mechanisms and outcomes of 
market entry into renewable power generation, I shed light on the implications for SLO 
engagement on these issues. Furthermore, by helping to shed light on the implications of 
utilizing PPPs to address some of these important issues, I also help inform current and 
future government policies and practices aimed at promoting these partnerships. 
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Research Context 
This study uses a unique dataset consisting of over 2,400 landfills in the United 
States in the years from 1970 and 2014. The first of these landfills was constructed in 
1909 and by 1970, 458 had been built, with the remaining landfills entering service after 
1970. The first landfills to generate power from the methane released from the landfill 
did so in 1979. Landfill gas (LFG) is a natural byproduct of the decomposition of 
organic material stored in these landfills. When solid waste is first deposited in landfills, 
it undergoes an aerobic reaction stage where any free oxygen in the waste is taken up by 
bacteria. Following this stage (typically within a year), anaerobic bacteria, a type that do 
not require oxygen, begin to decompose the waste in a process where methane and other 
gases are produced. LFG is largely split between methane (~50%) and CO2 (~50%), 
although a small percentage (less than 1%) consists of organic compounds. This gas, if 
not collected, is released into the atmosphere. Methane is a significant contributor to 
global warming, as it has an effect 25 times greater than CO2. Landfills are the third 
largest source of human-related methane emissions in the United States (18.2%) (EPA, 
2015b). LFG also contributes to local smog and pollution, as well as creating odor 
problems for the surrounding area.  
Not only does LFG pose a serious threat to the environment, it also represents an 
economic opportunity to landfill owners. LFG can be cleaned and utilized to burn power, 
produce heat, and can also be sold as a commodity to natural gas providers or 
organizations such as industrial factories who utilize the gas within their facilities. The 
first such landfill to capitalize on this opportunity installed a power generation unit that 
 9 
 
burned the LFG to provide power to landfill facilities on site (EPA, 2015b). Since then, 
approximately 726 landfills have chosen to collect the gas and utilize it for beneficial 
use. Of the landfills in the sample, approximately 50% are owned by public sector 
organizations such as cities, local districts, or state and federal agencies such as the 
military(EPA, 2015b). The other 50% of the landfills are owned by private sector 
organizations.  
The regulatory environment surrounding landfills and their emissions has in large 
part been shaped by the Clean Air Act, which in 1996 resulted in the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issuing the Standards of Performance for New 
Stationary Sources and Guidelines for Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid 
Waste Landfills (EPA Guidelines). This was a legislative action under Sections 111(b) 
and 111(d) of the Clean Air Act that was intended to reduce the potential of solid waste 
landfills to contribute significantly to air pollution levels. The EPA issued proposed 
guidelines for public comment and review in 1991, but the final ruling was not issued 
until early 1996. The guidelines established minimum performance standards to landfills 
designed to hold at least 2.5 million metric tons and 2.5 million cubic meters of waste, 
and that began construction or modification on or before May 30, 1991 and that accepted 
waste after November 8, 1987. Landfills built after May 30, 1991 would be required to 
comply with the guidelines provided they met the minimum size requirements. The main 
requirement in the guidelines were that landfills that met the criteria would be required 
to install LFG collection systems that would collect the gas and route it to “a non-
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enclosed flare, an enclosed combustion device, or a treatment system that processed the 
collected gas prior to subsequent sale or beneficial use” (EPA, 2015a: pg. 15-16). 
As stated in the EPA’s guidelines, landfills that met the criteria were forced to 
install a gas collection system by 2001. Once collected, the ruling allowed landfills 
several options to dispose of the collected gas. The first was to simply flare the gas off. 
The second option was to use the gas in a combustion engine (e.g., generator) that is 
designed to provide power and/or heat. The third option is to treat the gas to a certain 
quality and then sell it as a natural gas product. At the time of the ruling in 1996, there 
were 1,952 landfills that met the minimum size requirements (1,248 publically owned 
and 704 privately owned) (EPA, 2015b). Of these, 201 had chosen to go beyond the 
minimum requirement of flaring the gas, and had either installed a treatment system to 
allow them to sell the gas, or they had installed a combustion engine to generate power 
and/or heat 90 publically owned and 111 privately owned) (EPA, 2015b). By 2015, there 
were 2,338 landfills that met the minimum size requirements (1,496 publically owned 
and 842 privately owned), with 726 of them generating power from the collected gas 
(376 publically owned and 350 privately owned) (EPA, 2015b).  
It is also worth noting that in the last 30 years, there has been an increasing 
number of regulatory incentives influencing the rate of entry into the power generation 
market by these landfills. For instance, the development of an energy credit market has 
allowed landfills to acquire additional profits through selling the renewable energy 
certificates to those in mandatory renewable energy markets (EPA, 2017). Such 
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regulatory incentives can play a strong role in promoting entrepreneurship within the 
power industry (Sine et al., 2005).  
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Institutional Logics 
Explaining heterogeneity in entrepreneurial actions has become a focal concern 
for institutional theorists in recent years, especially for those interested in explaining the 
variations in entrepreneurial outcomes (Tolbert et al., 2011). Instead of an “iron cage” 
perspective that predicts homogeneity in behavior for organizations having the same 
form (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the institutional logics perspective is predicated on 
the assumption that social forms are influenced by logics at multiple levels, leading to 
variance in behavior. As such, the logics perspective is centered on understanding the 
processes and mechanisms by which organizational behavior is influenced by different 
logics. The logics perspective allows scholars the ability to consider the underlying 
actors and contexts in which organizations are situated in order to understand which 
values will be internalized by the organization (Selznick, 1957). Such a perspective 
allows us to better understand how organizations respond to and are influenced by the 
multiple logics represented by the context and actors within and around the organization. 
The following sections will explain in some detail about how the perspective emerged 
and its current theoretical principles. I will then discuss how state and market logics 
cause organizations to enter new markets in different ways as I develop each hypothesis.  
Early Foundations of the Institutional Logics Perspective 
The institutional logics perspective is a “metatheoretical framework for analyzing 
the interrelationships among institutions, individuals, and organizations in social 
systems” (Thornton et al., 2012: 2). It was developed to help scholars address questions 
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about how actors at both the individual and organizational-level are influenced by the 
institutional orders (e.g., family, religion, state, market) that surround them. The origins 
of this perspective arose in response to neo-institutional theory’s general rejection of 
rationality as the basis for conformity, instead focusing on the importance of legitimacy 
in leading to isomorphism in organizational behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In other words, neo-institutional theory looks 
at how culture and cognition can lead to homogeneity in organizations.  
The term institutional logics was first introduced by Alford and Friedland (1985) 
as they described the conflicting beliefs and practices in many institutions in the 
developed world. In that paper, they argued that there are three prominent institutional 
orders, each with different beliefs and practices that influence how individuals act: 
capitalism, state bureaucracy, and political democracy. Building on these early ideas, 
Jackall (1988), with his analysis of moral dilemmas in corporations, suggested that 
institutional logics described the way that the social world worked. Jackall drew upon 
the normative and structural concepts of neo-institutional theory to argue that actors are 
constrained by “rules, premiums, and sanctions” that individuals create (Jackall, 1988: 
112). Later, Friedland and Alford (1991) merged previously separate perspectives of 
rational choice and macro structure to suggest that there are core institutional orders that 
provide a core logic that guides individual actors. The conceptualization of society as an 
interinstitutional system is the key contribution of their 1991 essay, as it allows for 
institutions to conflict, providing a way for heterogeneity in actor behavior. Each of 
these central logics (i.e., market, state, family, democracy, religion) provide both 
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structure and symbols that may not only conflict, but that actors can utilize and 
manipulate to their advantage. Thus, for Friedland and Alford (1991), institutional logics 
are embodied in practices that not only constrain actors, but also allow actors the agency 
to act and change the world around them. Such agentic actors were conspicuously 
missing from neo-institutional theory’s model of structure and isomorphism.  
This early work on institutional logics suggested that while a focus on culture 
and cognition was an important concern in understanding organizations, eschewing the 
internalization of values prevents one from understanding heterogeneity in behavior 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Haveman & Rao, 1997). Combining the ideas from both 
Jackall (1988) and Friedland and Alford (1991), Thornton and Ocasio (1999) suggested 
that institutions consisted of three complementary dimensions: structural, normative, and 
symbolic, allowing them to link agency and cognition with socially constructed norms 
and structures. As such, a prominent assumption in the institutional logics perspective is 
that logics embody the values, beliefs, identities, and goals of individuals and 
organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), and that the behavior of individuals and 
organizations is both enabled and constrained by these logics. As such, the institutional 
logics perspective helps explain how structure and norms can influence rational, 
cognitive actions by both individuals and organizations. Importantly, the institutional 
logics perspective provides a framework to describe not only how individuals and 
organizations are influenced by logics, but how these actors can help build and change 
institutional logics (Thornton, 2004). 
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Guiding Principles of the Logics Perspective 
As a result of the work described above, as well as other work done in the last 15 
years, the institutional logics perspective has matured from a nascent theoretical 
perspective to a vibrant and flourishing field of study. Presently, there are eight 
interinstitutional orders that are most often discussed in the literature, although others 
may exist (Thornton et al., 2012): Market, Corporate, State, Professions, Family, 
Religion, Democracy, and Community. Each of these has a coherent set of attributes that 
make it apparent which logic is operating within an organization. Each order has 
different theoretical and practical implications for how individuals and organizations 
behave, as they are distinct in the way they influence the symbols and material practices 
instantiated by these actors.  
At the present time, there are three principles relevant to this dissertation that 
also help form the foundation for the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 
2012). First, the interrelationship between agency and structure is a critical assumption 
of the logics perspective. As a result of neo-institutionalists long-standing emphasis of 
isomorphism and homogeneity as a source of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977), scholars using a logics approach have tended to focus instead 
on how practices can vary among organizations (heterogeneity). However, it is important 
to consider that sources of both homogeneity and heterogeneity can coexist in 
organizations as a result of both structural constraints and underlying values and beliefs 
that represent the logics viewed as salient within and around the organization. This 
perspective of partial autonomy from structure has allowed concepts such as 
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“institutional entrepreneur” to be theorized and developed (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). 
Further, an interinstitutional system that has partial autonomy allows actors to draw upon 
various components of their surrounding culture and apply those pieces to their situation 
as needed (Swidler, 1986). Thus, while the logics perspective integrates both cognition 
and structure, it perhaps more importantly allows for action to be rational or irrational 
depending on the surrounding institutional orders (Thornton et al., 2012).   
A second key principle of the institutional logics perspective is that institutions 
consist of both material and symbolic elements (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Such a 
principle is a key differentiator between early neo-institutional theory (i.e., Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977) and the logics perspective. Material elements can include practices, 
structure, and rules. Symbolic elements provide ideation and meaning to actors, and each 
may be supported or influenced by the other (Thornton et al., 2012). For example, the 
market is at times assumed to be independent of culture (i.e., is able to operate in similar 
ways across contexts), which allows for efficient economic transactions. However, the 
market is certainly influenced by the culture and beliefs in which it is embedded, leading 
to significant differences in practices among organizations. Thus, the logics perspective 
allows researchers to distinguish and draw on both material and symbolic elements in 
order to better understand the mechanisms at work in their studies.  
A third important principle is that institutions exist at multiple levels, with actors 
being present in each level (i.e., societal, field, organization, community, and 
individual). As a result, researchers must consider how actors and situations may change 
when influenced by different levels (e.g., community versus societal), resulting in a 
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potential for cross-level interaction effects (Thornton et al., 2012). Working across-
levels will allow researchers to not only see how actors and situations change, but also 
better see and understand mechanisms influenced by the contradictory nature of 
institutional logics. For example, Lounsbury (2007) illustrates how organizations in the 
same industry institutionalized different logics (trustee versus professional) depending 
on their geographical location. Thus, logics can conflict not only within levels, but 
between levels. However, such cross-level interactions are rarely studied (see Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2015 for a notable exception). 
Organization Type 
Building on Pahnke et al. (2015), which assumed that organization type or 
structure is a better measure of organizational-level logics, this dissertation looks at how 
the type of organization helps provide a clearer understanding of how and why SLOs 
enter the market for renewable power and how much risk they will take upon market 
entry. Both state and market logics are significant institutional orders that significantly 
influence an organization’s structure, practices, identity and values (Albert & Whetten, 
1985; Glynn & Abzug, 2002). Each order provides a frame of reference that conditions 
actors’ sensemaking (Thornton et al., 2012), which can result in different rates of entry 
and risk-taking for each type of organization. However, the management literature to 
date has typically focused primarily on MLOs. In those instances where researchers have 
considered SLOs, they have often focused on contexts such as state owned enterprises 
(SOE’s) (Goldeng, Grünfeld, & Benito, 2008; Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, 
& Egri, 2006; Xu, Lu, & Gu, 2014) or non-profits (e.g., some hospitals) (Burgess & 
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Wilson, 1996) as forms of organizations that have significant stakeholders or values that 
may not be profit-based. Importantly, this literature has also typically focused on 
countries making a transition to some form of capitalism, such as in China (Xia & 
Walker, 2015).  
It is important to note that in making the argument that there are important 
differences between SLOs and MLOs that subsequently influence their likelihood of 
market entry, I am primarily focusing on SLOs and MLOs that are funded through 
similar market mechanisms such as market sales or user fees, thus increasing their 
autonomy from control mechanisms such as dependence on a few large government 
contracts. Such a focus reduces the concern of comparing organizations whose 
differences may be due more to variations in autonomy from control (e.g., high 
dependence on government grants or contracts) than ownership type (Perry & Rainey, 
1988). Such a focus also reduces concerns about differences due solely to publicness 
(Bozeman, 2013), as the publicness of both types of organizations is likely to be similar. 
The discussion below will look at the influence of an organizational logics on an 
organization’s decision to enter a new market and how much risk to take as it enters the 
market. I then look at hybrid organizations in the form of public-private partnerships 
(PPP) and the subsequent implications of hybrid logics on these same outcomes. Further, 
I also look at how organizational size and community-level values influence the 
propensity of SLOs to enter a market. 
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State versus Market Logic 
In studying the effects of state and market level logics on organizational action, it 
is important to consider how each logic would influence the symbols and practices 
within an organization, and at various levels above and below the organization. This is 
because logics become apparent as one studies the material practices and symbols of the 
organization, which are reflected in an organization’s basis of norms, basis of strategy, 
and the basis of attention. Each of these dimensions represent a coherent configuration 
of attributes that influence how organizations “perceive, pay attention to, evaluate, and 
respond to environmental stimuli” (Almandoz, 2014: 443). An organization’s basis of 
norms provides the rules by which an organization defines its members, where it obtains 
legitimacy, and from where it gets its authority (Thornton et al., 2012). The basis of 
strategy adhered to by the organization is dependent on the type of organization, as well 
as its strengths and weaknesses (Glynn, 2008; Pahnke et al., 2015). Last, an 
organization’s basis of attention is based on salient stakeholders, measures of success, 
and the feedback mechanisms through which the organization receives input on its status 
(Ocasio, 2011).  
The subsequent practices, processes, and goals of the organization stemming 
from these dimensions are very different for SLOs as compared to MLOs. Table 1 shows 
the relevant attributes for each logic and how that logic influences the organization. This 
table provides a concise overview of how each institutional order is distinguished from 
the other by looking at relevant attributes of each logic.  
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Table 1 Comparison of State and Market Logics 
 
 
In terms of identity, SLOs are formed and operate on the premise that these 
organizations are there to serve the public and that the organization serves as “stewards 
of the common,” preserving and protecting what is best for the general public. Often, 
these organizations are established as a means of providing public services that may be 
Attributes State Logic Market Logic
Sources of Identity Public Servant Business Owner
“Commons” Steward Entrepreneur
Sources of Legitimacy Voter Mandate Market Value
Sources of Authority Elected Boards & Councils Professional Managers
Bureaucratic Efficacy Market Efficacy
Citizen Electorate Owners & Shareholders
Sources of Income Citizen Taxation Product & Service Contracts
Tax Revenue Redistribution Business Diversification
Sources of Capital Government Grants Commercial Lenders
Government Loans Retained Earnings
Municipal Bonds Government Grants
Commercial Lenders
Organizational Form Government Bureaucracy Unitary or Multi-Divisional
Salient Stakeholders Elected Politicians Owners & Shareholders
Citizenry Customers
Technical Analysis Financial Analysis
Public Meetings Private Meetings
Bureaucratic Staff Managerial Staff
Vote by Elected Officials Executive Decision
Risk Profile Loose Coupling of Staff & Project 
Performance
Tight Coupling of Management & 
Project Performance
Feedback Mechanisms Elections Profit Margins
Success Measures Regulatory Compliance Increase in Profit
Winning Elections Winning Contracts
Decision Making 
Mechanisms
 21 
 
unprofitable or expensive, or where competition would be problematic. As a result, 
SLOs are often tasked with the responsibility of providing public services such as 
transportation, drinking water, or solid waste disposal to people within a geographical 
jurisdiction, obtaining their authority through a legislative action. MLOs on the other 
hand, are established to accomplish the goals of an individual or small group of business 
owners. As a result, the identity of MLOs can vary significantly depending on these 
owners. While it is possible that an MLO might see itself as a steward of the common, it 
is much more likely that the organization will be seen as a way for owners to generate 
revenue for the benefit of the owners, since MLOs are established and operated via 
elements of a market logic (Thornton et al., 2012). Such a focus on financial profit as the 
identity of the firm will likely lead the organization to be more adept at pursuing 
competitive advantage, entering new markets, and cost reduction through increased 
efficiency. In the context of SLOs, this means that the core identity of an SLO is tied to 
providing a public service that may include access to such utilities as drinking water, 
electricity and waste disposal services for residential, commercial, and industrial 
members within the jurisdiction of the organization.  
Closely tied to the organization’s identity is the manner in which they obtain 
legitimacy and authority. SLOs gain their legitimacy as the result of democratic approval 
of their constituents, as well as through compliance with regulatory standards. 
Democratic approval occurs either through election of the organization’s leaders, or 
through the selection and hiring of the organization’s leaders by elected officials. The 
key point here is that the legitimacy of an SLOs is tightly coupled to the approval not 
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only of their constituents, but also to compliance with regulatory standards. MLOs on 
the other hand, gain their legitimacy with shareholders predominantly through market 
performance. With regard to the authority that the organization has to act, SLOs gain 
their authority from a legislative action, as the founding charter of the organization has 
to be approved by a higher legislative body. For example, in order for a town or city to 
be formally chartered, the state legislature has to approve the formation of the 
organization. As part of this process, the new SLO is required to have a specific 
organizational structure that includes a council or board with elected or appointed 
members that governs a bureaucratic staff. The organization is also given specific 
requirements on how it operates in order to ensure that the organization’s actions are 
transparent to the electorate body to which it provides services. An MLO has no such 
formally charter or structure and can operate as it best sees fit, which is typically done by 
professional managers hired to oversee and protect the interest of the organization’s 
owners. Decisions are governed less by legislative mandate and more by the pursuit of 
economic profits. Structurally, these organizations are also typically less bureaucratic 
and hierarchical than an SLO because an MLO is primarily focused on efficiency. For 
instance, decisions can be made in a relatively short amount of time since an MLO does 
not have the same formal procedures and transparency requirements that an SLO does.  
As a result of the differences in the sources of identity, legitimacy, and authority 
for each type of organization, an organization’s symbols, practices, and values will be 
influenced in different ways that will impact whether the organization enters a new 
market. For an SLO, these include: (1) political ambiguity, which occurs as the result of 
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formal decision-making practices and greater attention to a diverse group of 
stakeholders, (2) measures of success that largely focus on regulatory compliance and 
quality of service, and (3) formalized decision-making processes that require additional 
time and effort from the organization’s employees. Each of these factors influences the 
likelihood that an SLO will enter a new market.  
Political Ambiguity: In the U.S., SLOs are typically based on a hierarchical 
bureaucracy that obtains its authority through a democratic process (e.g., mayor and city 
council at the municipality level or regional representatives at the county, state, and 
federal level). Typically, these organizations are overseen by a political body such as a 
council or board that is directly elected or appointed by elected officials and given 
administrative control over the organization (Milakovich & Gordon, 2013). This is true 
whether the SLO’s sole task is to operate a school district, a water system, or a landfill, 
which is often done through a special service district (e.g., a school district), or if 
disposal services are just one of many services (e.g., transportation, water, and/or 
electricity) provided by a organization. As a result of this hierarchical structure that is 
governed by an elected body, SLOs are more likely to be impacted by the logics of the 
community they reside in because they pay greater attention to the stakeholders within 
that community. Stakeholders are typically defined as “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose” (Freeman, 1984: 
53). In this context, the primary stakeholders are the individuals and organizations that 
reside and operate within the regulatory boundaries of the organization. The increased 
attention to stakeholders by SLOs is due primarily to two factors. First, stakeholder 
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theory predicts that stakeholders become salient to organizations because of exogenous 
influences such as regulatory measures (Kacperczyk, 2009) or the ability of certain 
stakeholders to control important resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Because of the 
democratic origins of the leadership, these organizations are “open systems” that are 
more likely to be influenced by a wider variety of stakeholders (residents, consumer 
groups, taxpayers, local businesses) (Boyne, 2002; Perry & Rainey, 1988). In other 
words, because of the statutory open meeting requirements of these organizations and 
the political body that leads the organization, stakeholders have a greater opportunity to 
influence these organizations. The second reason that SLO’s will be more likely to be 
influenced is because the employees of the SLO often live within these communities and 
thus are influenced either by subscribing to these logics themselves (Almandoz, 2014) or 
by being more cognizant of what logics are important (Crilly & Sloan, 2012).   
The main way in which stakeholders for an SLO are given an active voice in the 
organization is their ability to attend and participate in open meetings held by the 
organization. Because states in the U.S. require that actions voted on by the political 
body governing the SLO are presented to the public in open meetings, stakeholders are 
given the opportunity to attend and give their opinions in these meetings prior to a vote 
by the body (For example, the state of New York requires at least 72 hours public notice 
prior to prescheduled open meetings: Government, 2017). Similarly, agendas and 
minutes for these meetings are public information, and are typically posted online by the 
organization or a local media outlet (Government, 2017), making it relatively easy for 
interested members of the community to determine if the SLO is pursuing activities that 
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align with their personal interests. These norms in the organization, which stem from 
legislative action, result in greater visibility and opportunities for participation and 
contestation by concerned stakeholders such as citizens, activist groups and even the 
media (Chen & Bozeman, 2012).  
Beyond the structural implications from their legislative origins, SLOs obtain 
their identity from their citizens, which are able to influence the organization’s goals, 
activities, and values through acting as owners via lobbying the elected officials (Nutt & 
Backoff, 1993). However, in the absence of a large consensus within the organization’s 
constituents, there is often political ambiguity about what the identity of the organization 
should be. Thus, the leaders of the organization, who are elected or appointed to 
represent the public, will have greater difficulty not only understanding what the public 
wants, but also in coming to a consensus about what that actually means. Many 
communities do not have a high degree of political consensus and so there is often 
confusion and conflict about what identity the organization should have (Chen & 
Bozeman, 2012).  
Furthermore, for many SLOs, there are a high number of stakeholders that may 
seek to guide or influence the organization’s decisions. For example, Humboldt County 
in the northwestern portion of the state of California (population of approximately 
135,000) held a series of public engagement meetings over the course of three years in 
which more than 450 stakeholders were consulted as the county developed a new 
economic development strategy. These stakeholders ranged from local and state elected 
officials, tribal leaders, education professionals, clergy, business owners, and various 
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community members (Institute of Local Government, 2012). While not all SLOs seek to 
involve that many stakeholders directly, the reality is that these organizations have a 
large number of stakeholders that impose multiple goals on them (Boyne, 2002). As the 
number of salient stakeholders increases, so does the prospect of conflicting goals 
between stakeholders (Stahl & Mosher, 1971). The varied nature and demands of 
stakeholders often leads to political ambiguity for both elected officials and the SLO’s 
staff, who are unable to clearly determine what the public wants (Nutt & Backoff, 1993; 
Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012).  
In contrast, MLO’s have a much smaller number of stakeholders, even in the case 
of publically listed organizations, where the number of salient shareholders is often 
significantly less than 100. For an MLO, decisions as to what strategies the organization 
should pursue are largely under the direct and total control of the CEO and perhaps a 
few other senior managers and directors. Such a limited number of stakeholders that can 
have an influence results in greatly reduced political ambiguity for the MLO, making it 
relatively easy for the management to determine what course of action they should 
pursue. Thus, as a result of the increased political ambiguity for SLOs, they are less 
likely than MLOs to enter a market.  
Measures of Success: While SLOs face greater ambiguity from their stakeholders 
about whether they should pursue a venture that is different from their core mission, they 
have much less ambiguity about what measures of success are. For SLOs, measures of 
success largely consist of conformity with higher authority such as state and federal 
regulations (Meyer, 1979). This focus on compliance with regulatory requirements 
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results in less ambiguity about what the organizations should do, since regulatory 
requirements for these organizations are typically well established and highly visible, 
making them the de facto standard of performance for people within the organization. 
This focus on regulatory compliance by SLOs is in sharp contrast with MLOs, which 
have as their measure of success the amount of profit they generate.  
Further, these regulatory measures provide little managerial discretion in SLOs 
for typical workplace characteristics such as performance rewards and human resources 
(e.g., firing, hiring, and promotion). For example, “public employees enjoy greater job 
security because the procedures for taking greater punitive actions are so complex and 
time consuming that few people choose to pursue them” (Baldwin, 1987: 183). 
Combined with the large numbers of stakeholders and associated political ambiguity 
resulting from periodic elections that often interrupt the SLO’s plans, it becomes 
difficult for these organizations to develop and measure performance beyond what is 
required from a statutory perspective, leading to cautiousness and low innovation among 
employees (Rainey, 1989). SLO employees are also more likely to view innovation (i.e., 
proposing new ideas or heading unique projects) as extra-role behavior that they should 
be compensated for, which SLOs typically do not provide (Bysted & Jespersen, 2014). 
Further, SLOs are resistant to change and delegation of authority (Warwick, Meade, & 
Reed, 1975). MLOs on the other hand, are more likely to reward employees for 
innovation and other creative behaviors if those efforts lead to greater profit for the 
organization. This leads to greater innovation and creativity from employees seeking to 
improve the financial performance of the organization (Rainey, 1989). As a result, when 
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there is an opportunity for-profit, employees and owners are more willing to consider the 
ideas, even if the ideas or projects are not central to their core business.  
Formal Decision-Making Processes: A third characteristic of SLOs that makes 
market entry less likely than for MLOs is the formalized procedures for decision-
making. The more formal procedures include the need to get approval from a political 
body in a public meeting for any significant action or expenditure (Government, 2017). 
Where MLOs are typically able to make decisions quickly, SLOs have to follow specific 
processes and structures that require a great deal of time and effort (Milakovich & 
Gordon, 2013). Generally, projects such as a renewable power generation facility are 
conceptualized by a staff member, elected official, technical consultant, or even a 
member of the general public. Upon conceptualization, there is an internal review of the 
project by staff and officials. After that, the project is included in the capital facilities 
plan, which should be reviewed annually by both internal and external stakeholders and 
then voted on in a public session by the political body. At some point after the plan is 
approved, authorization is given by the political body to authorize the hiring of a 
professional service firm to plan, design and at some later point to provide design 
contract documents. Prior to obtaining bids (i.e., proposals) from contractors that provide 
a cost to build the project, the political body again provides approval of the 
specifications and design documents and authorizes their representatives to receive bids 
from general contracting firms. Upon completion of the bidding process, the political 
body again is required to approve the bids and award the project to the winning 
contractor, at which point construction can actually begin. Along the way, the political 
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body can halt the project at any point prior to construction contract documents being 
executed (City of Sea Isle, 2017). The overall process from preliminary planning, design 
and bidding, and then obtaining approval to construct the project often takes multiple 
years, depending on the complexity of the problem. This can threaten the ultimate 
success of the project should the political landscape change.  
These due process requirements for these organizations take a great deal of staff 
time and energy, and result in a decreased likelihood of market entry for SLOs as 
compared to MLOs, which do not have the same formalized decision-making processes. 
Rather, decision-making for these organizations is much more likely to include less 
formalized meeting requirements, where the CEO or perhaps the local manager can 
make the decision on his or her own, without having to present all of the information to 
salient stakeholders. This allows decisions to be made in a relatively short amount of 
time since they do not have to go through a staff review followed by one or more public 
meetings. Senior managers or owners can also approve ideas and actions without going 
through time-intensive procedures that are required for SLOs. Such informal decision-
making procedures for MLOs allows for greater flexibility and speed in pursuing market 
opportunities than their SLOs counterparts (Schaeffer & Loveridge, 2002). 
As a result of the state logic held by SLOs that leads to greater political 
ambiguity or uncertainty as a result of increased numbers of stakeholders, along with a 
relatively greater focus on statutory requirements as the measures of success for the 
organization, and a significantly more cumbersome formal decision-making process, 
SLOs will be less likely to enter new markets than MLOs. 
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Hypothesis 1: SLOs are less likely than MLOs to enter a new market. 
 
Risk-Taking 
While there are various ways of defining risk, including risk preferences, 
behaviors and actions, and firm outcomes, in this study, I define risk-taking as a firm 
strategy that involves a specific activity taken by an organization which has the potential 
of increasing risk to the firm (Bromiley, Rau, & Zhang, 2016). In defining risk this way, 
I am suggesting that organization can choose to take a risk simply by entering a new 
market. However, the magnitude of that risk can vary significantly depending on how the 
organization enters the market. In this context, risk-taking activity is related to how 
much of an investment the organization makes to install the power generation 
equipment, compared to the predicted methane output of the landfill. In other words, risk 
refers to ex ante as opposed to ex post risk. 
A consideration of how an organization enters the market is an important one for 
any context, but especially so for the context of landfills, as the decision to utilize the 
methane for power generation can expose the organization to a significant risk. The 
quantity and quality of the produced gas can vary unexpectedly and significantly, 
depending on the type of waste stored, the climate the landfill is located in, and how the 
gas is collected. Additionally, measurement equipment and estimation techniques can be 
faulty, resulting in significant errors in the amount of gas estimated. For instance, a 
landfill in the southwest U.S. recently installed power generation facilities to utilize the 
amount of gas that had been measured on an annual basis. However, within a year of 
installing the facility, the project had to be shut down as the methane production had 
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dropped to almost zero as the result of a serious drought. Additionally, in the years after 
initially entering the market, landfills often increase their capacity by installing 
additional capacity, or they may mothball one or more of their generators to reduce 
production capacity. This usually occurs when methane production is not what it was 
expected to be. Some landfills may even exit the power generation market altogether. 
As a result of this substantial risk, those landfills that do enter the market may 
approach market entry in a variety of ways. While some enter it conservatively by 
installing a limited number of generators that utilize only a fraction of the potential 
capacity based on expected methane output from the landfill, others install equipment to 
utilize all of the predicted methane output. For example, if a landfill produces enough 
methane to produce 1 megawatt of power (MW), one landfill may actually install 
enough equipment to generate 0.5 MW of power, which is half of what could be 
generated if more generators were installed. Another landfill with the same potential to 
generate 1 MW of power may choose to install enough generators to produce 1 MW of 
power, thus taking advantage of the full opportunity (for a relevant example, see 
Bharathan, 2011).  
Importantly, landfills pursuing these projects typically install multiple generators 
independently of whether they are trying to utilize the full amount of estimated methane 
(EPA, 2016),  which is done for a number of reasons. The first is that installing the 
project in stages allows the landfill to continue producing power, even if a unit breaks 
down or needs to be pulled out of service for routine maintenance. The second reason is 
that the quantity of emitted gas is not consistent over time, nor is it easy to quantify prior 
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to the project. Installing a single generator will likely result in the generator running at a 
reduced level, resulting in reduced efficiency and overall life of the equipment. Installing 
multiple units allows the operator to run most of the generators at full capacity, with the 
potential of increasing/decreaseing units as the quantity/quality of gas varies. The third 
reason is related to the emitted gas. Because the emitted gas can vary significantly in 
both quantity and quality over the months and years that follow the project, 
organizations can enter the market by installing one or more small generating systems 
that use only a portion of the expected gas. This allows the organization to pilot the 
system, giving it the ability to test both the system’s technical ability and methane 
capacity without expending a larger amount of capital to install the equipment necessary 
to generate the full amount of potential power.  
To summarize, the measure of risk in this dissertation is related to whether the 
organization installs all of the equipment that it needs to capture and convert the 
methane to energy, or whether it installs only a portion of the equipment, resulting in a 
limited capacity to generate methane that reduces the organization’s potential risk 
exposure.  
State Logic Organizations 
While SLOs will be less likely to enter the market due to the material and 
symbolic elements stemming from their organizational logic, those same characteristics 
will make them more likely to take risk as they enter the market. While the technology to 
capture and utilize the methane gas for power has been widely available for over fifty 
years, these projects still have some significant risks to them, some of which were 
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described above. Other risks originate from both administrative and functional issues 
that can arise not only during the planning and construction phase, but also when the 
project itself outperforms expectations. Potential risks for these projects include 
technical issues such as lower than expected methane quantity and quality, financial 
risks (e.g., downturn in the economy, decreased prices in traditional power sources), 
stakeholder risks (activists, lawsuits from a nearby resident, etc.), political risks (e.g., a 
change in political body or voter opinion), or the acquisition of the organization by 
another firm. Risk-taking by these organizations is influenced by their structure and 
decision-making processes, financing strategy, and reduced liability for individuals 
within the organization, which all occur as the result of the state logic that the 
organization is based on.  
Formal Structure and Decision-Making Processes: The first way in which a SLO 
is more likely to take risk comes as a result of its structure and decision-making process, 
which are much more formal in nature than those of MLOs. As discussed above, SLOs 
have a structure and decision-making process that are to a large degree mandated by 
legislative authority. The bureaucratic structure of SLOs results in lower managerial 
autonomy and greater effort to get projects approved due to the additional rules and red 
tape that are present in the organization (Boyne, 2002). Consequently, as projects 
proceed through the approval process, managers and other proponents of the project are 
more likely to try and get approval to build and operate the full capacity facility, which 
would prevent them from having to go through success planning, design, and 
construction phases, all of which are more difficult and time intensive for an SLO. The 
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decision-making practices of MLOs are much less formal, allowing these organizations 
to make decisions more quickly. Such an informal process that is not subject to extensive 
bureaucracy and regulatory limitations makes it easy for the organization and its staff to 
repeat the process, making it more likely that it will be willing to pursue the project in a 
number of stages or steps, as future projects can be planned and built with relatively less 
red tape and effort by those who are responsible to manage the project approval and 
construction process. As a result SLOs are more likely than MLOs to take risk as they 
enter the market. 
Another reason by which the structure and decision-making process can lead to 
increased risk-taking is the lengthy approval process. As mentioned previously, SLO 
organizations are focused on compliance with regulatory statutes, making them more 
likely to utilize professional experts who can help ensure that the project will be 
successful. These professionals include a variety of engineers (e.g., electrical, civil, and 
mechanical), finance officers, and legal counsel (DiNapoli, 2009), all of whom study the 
project from multiple perspectives and provide guidance and counsel on how the project 
should be designed and implemented. While this process is expensive and lengthy, it 
results in greater confidence that the project will comply with regulations and will 
adequately perform in a way that will be acceptable to the many stakeholders of the 
organizations. As a result, the SLO will be more likely to take risk as it will have more 
fully vetted the opportunity. While MLOs typically utilize the same types of 
professionals, the focus of the organization is on making profit. Since MLOs do not have 
the same regulatory requirements that govern their decision-making process, they will be 
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more likely to rely on fewer decision-makers, who will be incentivized to push for 
increased speed and efficiency in designing and implementing the project. This can lead 
to fewer challenges to the project, as well as effectively reducing the time spent by 
professionals who are designing and building the project. As a result, MLOs will be less 
sure that their information is correct, leading them to be more cautious as they enter a 
new market. 
Financing Strategy: Another way in which SLOs are more likely to take risk 
upon market entry is because of their financing strategy, which includes both their 
sources of income and their ability to finance the projects through external sources of 
funding. SLOs are authorized to obtain their income through the taxation of individuals 
and organizations in their service area (e.g., such as a property or sales tax). This ability 
comes from the legislative mandates of the organization, and provides them coercive 
power to raise taxes to fund approved projects (Stahl & Mosher, 1971).  
Other sources of income include disposal and tipping fees (revenue collected 
when customers bring solid waste individually for disposal), special assessments, impact 
fees (collected when homes or buildings are built in the service area), state and federal 
grants and loans (e.g., Community Development Block Grant or a state revolving loan 
fund), and commercial funds in the form of long term loans or debt obligation such as a 
“revenue bond” (Government, 2016). However, as part of the financing process, the 
SLO’s governing body would have to go through the lengthy and difficult approval 
process outlined above. If significant revenue is needed, it may even need to hold a 
public vote to gain approval for the increase. Since these SLOs have the authority to tax 
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or otherwise charge a fee to all entities within their jurisdiction, their income base is very 
stable.  
Should revenues fail to cover expenses, nearly all of these organizations are 
actually legally obligated to balance their budgets (NLC, 2017), resulting in a need to 
either reduce expenditures or to raise taxes or fees. This stability in their income stream 
results in organizations being less concerned about financial insolvency should the 
ventures fail. In other words, the relationship between risk-taking and firm survival for 
these organizations is loosely coupled, resulting in SLOs being more likely to take risk 
upon market entry. In contrast, MLOs cannot tax their customers, and are limited to 
customer fees for their source of income, making their revenue stream less stable. 
Should they increase fees too much, they can lose customers, resulting in decreased 
revenue and endangering their survival, making SLOs more likely than MLOs to take 
risk during market entry. 
A second component of an SLO’s financing strategy that leads to increased risk-
taking is that SLOs have access to financing options that are unavailable to MLOs. For 
instance, there are a variety of state and federal grant programs that would offer 
assistance for eligible organizations. Programs such as those offered by the US 
Department of Agriculture’s Rural Development Loan and Grant program or the 
Community Development Block Grant program administered by the US Department of 
Housing and Urban Development provide relatively easy access to grants and low cost 
loans that can be used for improvement projects such as renewable energy. Often, SLOs 
also have access to grants or low-interest rate loans from state and non-profit programs.  
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Further, they can often obtain low rate commercial loans from commercial 
lenders, as these types of organizations have a lower risk of bankruptcy than MLOs. 
While there have been some high profile bankruptcy filings by SLOs, the fact is that in 
2012, there were over 89,000 local SLOs in the US (Bureau, 2012). Of those, only 13 
filed for bankruptcy (Reserve, 2014), a default rate that is approximately an order of 
magnitude below that for loans to MLOs, which have had a default rate ranging from 
just under 1% to more than 6% in the last 30 years (System, 2017). This increased rate of 
bankruptcy makes it more difficult for MLOs to obtain financing for projects since 
MLOs often are a bigger risk for the financing institution than an SLO. Further, they 
cannot simply raise fees to pay for a project as they are subject to a competitive market 
where customers may go elsewhere. The ability to get cheaper financing coupled with a 
typically stable income source makes it more likely that SLOs will take greater risk 
during market entry than MLOs. 
Reduced Liability: From an incentives standpoint, the same red tape and rules 
that make it more difficult for SLOs to enter the market also make it more likely that 
they take risk once they do decide to enter the market. For instance, both the staff and 
the political governing body in these organizations are protected from any liability under 
various federal and/or state tort laws. While SLO officers and employees do not 
typically have sovereign immunity, they are still protected by a variety of limitations and 
exceptions, especially while acting within the scope of their authority or in the course of 
their duties (NCSL, 2017; Orlando, 2011). These projects are usually justified using a 
lengthy political process designed to be completely transparent in nature, resulting in 
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greater effort to gain approval for a project. This process typically relies heavily on the 
analysis and recommendations given by technical experts such as professional engineers 
who have studied the matter, which has the effect of increasing the chances of success 
while decreasing the chance of the organization, the staff or the political governing body 
being held liable for a project that fails to meet expectations. Further, SLO employees 
are typically more difficult to fire because the organization is required to adhere to 
complex and time-consuming procedures (Baldwin, 1987). As a result, staff who 
recommend and pursue these projects are protected from many of the negative 
repercussions that an MLO employee is subjected to, leading to a greater propensity for 
risk-taking by theSLO. Both MLO employees and the organization itself lack the 
protection given SLOs by these same regulatory measures, and it is easier to dismiss or 
fire MLO employees. In the MLO, an employee who pursues a project that does not 
result in profits for the organization can easily be fired, since the focus for the 
organization is on profitability and efficiency. The increased liability at both the 
individual and organizational-level means that MLOs will be less likely to take risk as 
they enter the market.  
Hypothesis 2: SLOs will take more risk than MLOs as they enter a new market. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships 
While logics are theoretically distinct (e.g., state, market, church, family, 
professions), individuals and organizations are often exposed to multiple institutional 
logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991) at various levels (i.e., societal, field, community, 
organization). Research in this area has looked at how logics multiplicity influences 
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hybrid organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013), which are 
defined as organizations that “instantiate the values and practices associated with 
multiple distinct field- or societal-level logics” (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, In 
Press). Logic multiplicity within organizations has been studied in a variety of contexts 
such as microfinance (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 2015), tech firms (Powell & 
Sandholtz, 2012; Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2013), social enterprises (Tracey, 
Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011), banks (Almandoz, 2014), utilities (Jay, 2013), and 
manufacturing firms (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010).  
Since the logics perspective allows for logics to exist at multiple levels, such as 
the organization, community and societal, it addresses organizations that span the public 
and private sectors, such as in the case of a public/private partnership (PPP) (Tracey et 
al., 2011). Such combinations of “core elements” (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), which 
refer to identities, forms, values, beliefs and other aspects of organizations, can violate 
and even alter institutionalized norms about what is appropriate for an organization 
(Tracey et al., 2011). From a logics perspective, hybrid organizations mix values and 
practices that are normally associated with more than one field or societal logic 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Jay, 2013). However, in the case of PPPs, these 
organizations span different organizational-level logics, which are persistent over time in 
the partnership (Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, & Spee, 2015).  
In the United States, and many other areas of the world, PPPs typically consist of 
a partnership between SLOs and MLOs to provide or improve an existing public good or 
service, such as improved transportation, water and sanitation, municipal solid waste 
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collection and disposal, and energy production and development. Partnerships such as a 
PPP allows the combination of skill and resources from both sectors as well as allowing 
participating organizations to share risk. The World Bank Group defines PPPs as a 
“long-term contract between a private party and a public sector entity, for providing a 
public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management 
responsibility and remuneration is linked to performance” (2017).  
PPPs are increasingly utilized as an important tool to address a variety of social 
and economic issues in every part of the world. For instance, the US 2018 proposed 
budget seeks to expand the use of PPPs for space exploration, traffic control, veteran 
affairs, and drinking water systems (2017). PPPs are now used in more than 134 
countries and represent approximately 15-20% of infrastructure investment across the 
world (Apfalter, 2017). Many governments are turning to this type of organizational 
form as a valuable option to address infrastructure needs (e.g., repair and replacement, 
new capital projects) as SLOs are increasingly unable to obtain funding from federal and 
state sources that were the traditional vehicles for these projects. In other words, SLOs 
are increasingly faced with resource constraints and changing stakeholder opinion, 
forcing these organizations to increasingly consider alternative mechanisms to meet the 
needs of their constituents (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, & Dowell, 2006).  
PPPs have typically been evaluated from theoretical perspectives such as 
transaction cost economics and agency theory using arguments such as efficiency or the 
costs of opportunism (Rangan, Samii, & Van Wassenhove, 2006; Rufín & Rivera-
Santos, 2012). However, these perspectives focus largely on various types of control 
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mechanisms, such as formal or informal contracts, equity, or interpersonal constructs 
such as trust (Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012), which are typically associated with a 
market logic (i.e., cost efficiency) or family logic (i.e., relational). These perspectives 
thus fail to consider how institutional mechanisms such as regulatory requirements and 
access to financing, which stem from an organization’s logic (i.e., market vs state), 
influence PPP outcomes.  
Because PPPs include a contractual relationship between SLOs and MLOs, each 
of which incorporates distinct logics (state and market), there are significant concerns of 
conflict stemming from values, practices, and goals that may not align (Besharov & 
Smith, 2014). This can lead to organizational-level issues such as mission drift 
(Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014), which can result in decreased organizational 
effectiveness (Jay, 2013; Zhao & Grimes, 2016). The combination of logics can also 
make it difficult for members of the organization to understand or agree on issues, which 
can lead to conflict. Such conflict is especially likely where there are multiple groups or 
a structural separation between logics (Almandoz, 2014), such as in the case of PPPs. At 
the individual level, members of the organization may experience inner conflict as they 
try to determine what the appropriate course of action is when there are two conflicting 
logics (Smets et al., 2015). 
However, in some cases, the elements from each logic may lead to cohesion 
between the organizations and the parties within them, leading to beneficial outcomes 
such as greater innovation (Jay, 2013) or increased efficiency (McPherson & Sauder, 
2013). Such benefits can occur as existing norms, values or practices are challenged by 
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the incoming logic (Dalpiaz, Rindova, & Ravasi, 2016), allowing individuals and groups 
to pursue new ideas or to do their work in ways which they were previously not allowed 
(Jarzabkowski, Smets, Bednarek, Burke, & Spee, 2013; McPherson & Sauder, 2013).  
PPPs and Market Entry 
While the literature has found that hybrid organizations face significant 
challenges and opportunities in allowing multiple logics to exist within the organization, 
PPPs present a specific case of hybrid organizations that influence the relationship 
between SLOs and market entry for several reasons. First, the different logics of the 
partners in terms of values, goals, and practices leads to increased uncertainty in the 
partnership (Parkhe, 1991), resulting in a greater reliance on formal means of 
governance. Many regulatory and non-profit organizations recommend that PPPs should 
be governed by well-defined contracts that are established through a competitive bid for 
services (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2011; Sabol & Puentes, 2014; 2017). Past 
research has suggested that contracts become more complex as the activities and parties 
to the contract have more occasions for opportunism (Hart, 1995). Further, best practice 
guides suggest that the SLOs set quantifiable, specific goals for the project that are based 
on sound economic, financial, technological principles and meet the needs of key 
stakeholders for the organization (Sabol & Puentes, 2014). In essence, increased 
uncertainty between partners will lead to a more specific and detailed scope being 
defined in the contract (Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012). Both of these mechanisms help 
reduce goal ambiguity for the partnership by specifying in contract form clear 
expectations and performance awards for the partnership. For example, in establishing a 
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partnership, both organizations are forced to consider and commit to the upfront and 
long-term costs (i.e., whole-of-life) for the agreement. This increases the likelihood that 
both organizations will carefully evaluate the requirements of the project. It also allows 
the SLO to transfer at least some of the risk to the MLO, while giving the MLO the 
opportunity to profit from the transaction in a way that increases the quality or quantity 
of the service provided by the SLO (World Bank Group, 2017). The additional goal 
clarity achieved through these efforts allows the partnership to focus its efforts on 
contract compliance, meaning that both organizations are more likely to follow through 
with the contractual obligations. Since both organizations are legally liable for contract 
compliance once the contract is executed, there is little opportunity for political, 
administrative and stakeholder challenges to arise. Such clarity in the contractually 
specified goals for the partnership result in the SLO becoming more likely to enter the 
market when the SLO takes on an MLO partner.  
Another way in which PPPs would increase the likelihood of market entry by an 
SLO is expanded access to financing (World Bank Group, 2017). Funding for SLOs can 
become politically or even statutorily impossible in some cases. The use of a private 
sector partner allows SLOs to pursue projects, even when budgets are restricted due to 
shortfalls, or in those times when the political body is favorable to the project but will 
not approve it due to concerns about raising fees or exposing the organization to undue 
risk (Engel et al., 2011). PPPs in this context generally involve little to no cash outflow 
by the SLO partner, as the MLO partner is required to fund the project initially and 
maintain it for a specified period of time in return for the rights to revenues from the 
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project, which provides the MLO the opportunity to recoup its investment over time 
(World Bank Group, 2017). While the financing available to the MLO partner is likely 
to be more expensive than that available to the SLO, the MLO is going to be more 
focused on profit, and will thus be able to gain enough in efficiency with the partnership 
to outweigh this additional cost.  
The third way in which a PPP leads to increase likelihood of market entry by an 
SLO is due to the increased attention on profit by the partnership. As SLOs enter into 
these partnerships, it will likely consider not only what it would cost the MLO to 
complete and operate the project, but also what the financial implications are for the 
MLO. Doing so helps the SLO prevent undue forfeiture of gains that normally are 
captured by the MLO. This increased focus on profit by the SLO also helps reduce goal 
ambiguity (Engel et al., 2011), as the reliance on formal contracts will likely result in 
defined tasks, goals and responsibilities for each party to the contract. The MLO will 
also be more likely to challenge the existing norms and practices in a search for greater 
profit, which will not only result in greater efficiency, but can also lead to greater 
innovation by members of both organizations as they seek to combine practices and 
symbols based on both state and a market logics (Jay, 2013). For PPPs, this means that 
there will be a greater willingness to pursue non-traditional activities or markets that can 
help both organizations achieve the goals inherent in each logic. Often, PPPs are based 
on the assumption that the MLO can recapture its investment in as little as 5 years (EPA, 
2016), which is often well within the timeframe of the contract. Thus, as a result of 
decreased goal ambiguity, greater access to financing, and an increased focus on profit, 
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an SLO that partners with an MLO will be more likely to enter the new market than an 
SLO that doesn’t partner with an MLO.  
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between SLOs and market entry will be positively 
moderated by a partnership with an MLO such that the likelihood of market entry 
will be increased when an SLO partners with an MLO. 
 
PPPs and Risk-taking 
PPPs are also likely to influence the relationship between SLOs and risk-taking, 
as MLOs have different decision-making processes, tighter coupling of management and 
risk-taking, and a greater focus on profit and associated financial statements. As has 
been mentioned, the decision-making process for MLOs is more efficient and less time 
intensive than for SLOs, making it easier for MLOs to go through the approval process. 
When an SLO partners with an MLO for management of a facility or project, the 
decision-making process is simplified as the MLO can make decisions about which 
opportunities to pursue more quickly than an SLO can by itself. Part of the reason for 
this increase in decision-making efficiency is the reliance on formal contracts as a means 
of governing the relationship. Such contracts provide enough clarity in goals for the 
organization that MLOs are given greater decision-making responsibilities as long as 
those decisions are related to the goals in the contract. Thus, PPPs allow MLO partners 
to handle at least part of the decision-making process, making it more streamlined and 
efficient, with greater goal clarity. This in turn leads to a greater willingness to repeat the 
process, making it more likely that PPPs will take less risk as they enter a market.  
A second reason for less risk-taking by PPPs is a tighter coupling between 
managers and risk-taking. As was discussed previously, the staff in an SLO is relatively 
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decoupled from risk should they push the SLO to pursue new opportunities. As a result, 
the staff is less likely to be fired or face negative consequences, leading to increased 
risk-taking. However, when the SLO partners with an MLO, not only does the MLO 
assume at least part of the risk of pursuing new opportunities, but the managers of the 
MLO are more tightly coupled to organizational outcomes. Should MLO managers 
pursue an opportunity that does not provide the profit margins sought by the MLO, the 
managers are more likely to experience negative repercussions from the failure, making 
them less likely to take large amounts of risk (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Rather, these managers will be more likely to take small amounts of risk as they 
first enter a new market, expanding on the investment over time as uncertainty about the 
opportunity is decreased over time.  
A third reason that PPPs will be less likely to take risk as they enter a new market 
is because of their sources of income. Even though SLOs can face public criticism for 
seeking additional fees or taxes to cover expenses should an opportunity not work out, 
the public outcry is likely to be increased when the SLO has an MLO managing the 
organization. This stems from common, potentially misplaced perceptions that the MLO 
is simply seeking to increase its profit margins. This increased mistrust of MLO 
intentions is not limited to the general public, but can also arise among the leaders of an 
SLO, who are ultimately responsible to act in the public’s best interest. As a result, there 
are likely to be significant contractual restrictions placed on when and how fees can be 
increased by the MLO. Such formal contractual mechanisms are used to check potential 
self-interested behavior by the MLO, making it more difficult for MLOs to increase fees 
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should pursuit of the new market entry not provide the expected return. Thus, I 
hypothesize that when an SLO partners with an MLO, they will become less likely that 
SLOs will take risk as they enter a new market.  
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between SLOs and risk-taking will be negatively 
moderated by a partnership with an MLO such that the level of risk-taking will 
be lower when an SLO partners with an MLO. 
 
Organizational Size 
As organizations grow in size, they accumulate knowledge and other resources 
that influence an SLO’s propensity to both enter a new market and take risk. With 
increased size, the staff employed by these organizations become more specialized due 
to the often narrow scope of their position. As staff become more specialized, the goal 
ambiguity in their role is reduced, allowing them to better identify opportunities that are 
related to their expertise (Nutt & Backoff, 1993). They are thus more willing and able to 
put forth the effort and time effort needed to get the projects through the planning and 
approval process. As they become more specialized, they are also better able to monitor 
their environment to identity potential opportunities, as well as being more capable of 
pursuing the opportunity. This is also true for technical and legal consultants that the 
organization hires. Typically, as SLOs grow, the capital projects they embark on become 
larger and more complex due to the need to serve a larger number of constituents 
(Masson & LeSage, 1994). As a result, larger SLOs are more likely to hire more 
specialized consultants that work with a greater number of organizations over a large 
geographical area, such as a large region of the US, or even internationally. These 
consultants provide the organization with knowledge and expertise that local consultants 
 48 
 
or staff may not be able to provide in order to design and construct the large projects 
required by these organizations.  
Another way in which greater organizational size increases an SLO’s likelihood 
of market entry is the increase in knowledge, assets and resources that provide larger 
organizations with a greater ability and willingness to finance projects. Larger SLOs are 
more likely to have a greater number of ongoing large projects, making it more likely 
that the entire organization will be more willing to take on another project, as the 
organization and the people within it have greater knowledge and experience. As a 
result, the staff, management, and political leaders are more familiar with the decision-
making processes, making it easier for them to navigate the formal decision-making 
processes. Furthermore, larger SLOs are more likely to have greater access to capital and 
financing than smaller SLOs do, making it easier to secure necessary funding for these 
projects as they have a greater revenue base and ability to finance projects. In summary, 
as SLOs grow, they have more focused resources, knowledge, and access to external 
information that will result in these organizations being more willing to enter new 
markets than smaller SLOs.  
Hypothesis 5: Organizational size will moderate the relationship between SLOs 
and market entry such that larger organizational size will be associated with 
greater likelihood of SLO market entry.  
 
Organization Size and Risk-taking 
Organizational size also has implications for the amount of risk-taking that SLOs 
engage in. As these organizations increase in size, their increased ability to fund and 
finance projects will increase their willingness pursue a new project, as it is easier to 
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gain the necessary funds. Smaller organizations do not have the same access to capital or 
other types of financing, resulting in a decreased likelihood of taking larger amounts of 
risk as they invest in a new market. Part of a larger organization’s increased willingness 
to fund or finance new projects comes from a greater ability to hire more specialized 
personnel. Such expertise allows the organization to more quickly and accurately 
identify and evaluate the opportunity. The greater expertise that these organizations have 
access to includes the retaining of financial and technical consultants that a smaller 
organization may not be able to afford. This specialized knowledge and staff give the 
organization greater confidence that the project will work as intended.  
Another reason that organizational size will influence an SLO’s risk-taking is 
related to the SLO’s experience and knowledge of handling large capital projects. As 
organizations grow in size, they will be more likely to have past and ongoing projects 
that have provided the organization with the experience and willingness to take on 
another project. As an SLO grows in size, it is are more likely to see pursuit of the 
opportunity as just another project rather than as a large undertaking that may pose 
significant political and technical risk for the organization and its constituents. For 
example, the Bureau of Sanitation in City of Los Angeles Public Works department has 
a FY2018 budget of over $272 million dollars, which is less than 3% of the city’s $9.29 
billion dollar budget (Los Angeles, 2017). The Sanitation Bureau handles not only solid 
waste disposal for city residents, but also manages the sewer treatment and collection 
system, along with the city’s watershed protection program. It recently completed an 
anaerobic gas digester project that cost in excess of $200 million and has several other 
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large capital projects in process of design and construction (Committee, 2014). Smaller 
SLOs are less likely to have the experience with large projects, leading to an increased 
aversion to risk for smaller SLOs.  
Additionally, as SLOs grow in size, the elected political body, whose time and 
resources are limited, is not able to be as involved in the management of the 
organization. As a result, managers and lower level staff are given greater responsibility 
to pursue opportunities and make decisions. Since these larger organizations have 
greater access to both technical and financial resources, both the staff and the consultants 
they hire become more specialized and have greater experience in understanding both 
the risks and benefits of the project. Thus, when a decision to pursue the opportunity is 
made by an SLO to enter a market, the SLO will be more willing to pursue the full 
potential of the opportunity.  
Hypothesis 6: Organizational size will positively moderate the likelihood of risk-
taking by SLOs such that larger organizational size will be associated with 
greater risk-taking by SLOs. 
 
Community Values 
The answer to the question of why there is heterogeneity between organizational 
actions is not solely answered by a discussion of organizational logics instantiated 
through organizational type. A significant body of research has shown that the values 
and beliefs of the individuals within the organization can have an influence on the 
organizations actions and performance, utilizing such theoretical perspectives as the 
upper-echelons perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the behavior theory of the firm 
(Cyert & March, 1963), and institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Much of this 
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work has looked at how the underlying values, beliefs and knowledge of the firm’s 
leaders influence the firm, such as the CEO (Boivie, Lange, McDonald, & Westphal, 
2011; Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, & Hambrick, 2017), directors 
(Almandoz & Tilcsik, 2015; Gupta & Wowak, 2017), owners (Almandoz, 2012), and 
other senior managers (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, & Graffin, 2014).  
While this work and the theories utilized are extremely important in helping us 
understand that individuals can and do influence important organizational actions and 
outcomes, another body of work has begun to look at the community-level of analysis. 
The idea that values and beliefs at the community-level can have an important influence 
on organizational decision-making is not new as early institutional theory was based on 
the premise that local sources of culture and values are important for predicting 
organizational behavior (Selznick, 1949; Zald, 1970). However, neo-institutional theory 
developed in the 70’s and 80’s had a geographically independent focus on institutional 
field or societal level effects (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). In the last 20 years, research 
has begun to look at the community-level of analysis, acknowledging that geography 
does have an important influence on how individuals and organizations are influenced 
by field and societal level institutions. For example, there has been a recent surge of 
work on the importance of community-level effects that has spanned several theoretical 
areas such as the behavioral theory of the firm (O'Brien & David, 2014), stakeholder 
theory (Argandoña, 1998), organizational identity (Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Marquis, 
Glynn, & Davis, 2007), and institutional logics (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015).  
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The recognition that organizations are also influenced by beliefs and values of 
the community in which the organization is embedded is a foundational aspect of the 
institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012). Recognizing that logics can exist 
and interact at different levels of analysis has been a recent focus of research based on 
the common question of how logics at multiple levels influence organizations. Work in 
this field suggests that logics exist at the individual (Almandoz, 2012), organizational 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010), community (Marquis & Battilana, 2009), and organizational 
field-levels of analysis (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Nascent research has begun to look 
at the manner in which logics at different levels interact to influence organizational 
decision-making. One such study looked at how logics at the community-level can filter 
higher-level logics, leading to variation in environmental performance (Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2015).  
The influence of local communities on organizations has been linked to 
competitive markets (Lounsbury, 2007), corporate social responsibility (Marquis et al., 
2007), entrepreneurship (Kwon, Heflin, & Ruef, 2013), the labor market for executives 
(Yonker, 2017), and the way that organizations respond to higher level logics (Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2015). These communities embody “local understandings, norms, and rules 
that can serve as touchstones for legitimizing” organizational behavior by providing 
local actors with a framework that they can draw on to make sense of their situation 
(Marquis et al., 2007: 927). The idea that communities contain localized information 
about legitimacy models is not new and can be found in work by Weber (1922) and 
Selznick (1949). Organizations that reside within these communities are subject to the 
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regulative, normative and cognitive forces specific to that community. In the case of 
SLOs, community values, identities, and goals are reflected within the general 
population living within the community the organization represents.  
Past definitions of community have included from an institutional order or logic 
(Thornton et al., 2012), collective groups of like-minded individuals (Faraj & Johnson, 
2011), geographically bounded entities (Kwon et al., 2013; Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 
2013), and even a level of analysis (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015). Despite these differences 
in conceptualizations, communities are essentially a form of collective and economic 
action (O'Mahony & Lakhani, 2011) that through various processes and mechanisms 
such as social movements, group polarization, and shared identity, have the ability to 
drive heterogeneity in organizational behavior and outcomes.  
For this dissertation, I view a community as a geographically bounded political 
entity such as a town, city, special service district, or a county. Such a focus on 
geographic boundaries allows me to utilize the community as “a local level of analysis 
corresponding to the populations, organizations, and markets, located in a geographic 
territory and sharing, as a result of their common location, elements of local culture, 
norms, identity, and laws” (Marquis & Battilana, 2009: pg. 286). Defining community as 
a level of analysis that reflects the underlying beliefs and values of the constituents 
within its boundary provides a framework that allows me to link the values of the 
community with the values of the organization, through illustrating how SLOs are more 
susceptible to internalization of community values through the influence of the 
organization’s leaders and employees.  
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Political Ideology 
Logics are associated with the material practices and symbolic constructions of 
the actors in the community (Friedland & Alford, 1991). As such, the underlying values, 
identity, and activities of individuals and organizations within a community may be 
represented by political ideologies that are a collective reflection of the perceptions of 
the individuals and organizations that reside within the boundaries of the community. 
Prior management research has looked at how the political ideologies of firms and their 
leaders influence risk-taking (Christensen et al., 2014), corporate social responsibility 
(Briscoe, Chin, & Hambrick, 2014; Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2017), executive 
compensation (Chin & Semadeni, 2017; Gupta & Wowak, 2017), and even corporate 
misconduct and litigation (Hutton, Jiang, & Kumar, 2015). Yet management research 
has rarely looked at how the political ideologies of the surrounding community in which 
the organization is embedded influences firm actions and outcomes (a notable exception 
is Pe'er & Gottschalg, 2011). This is especially surprising given the substantial literature 
that looks at how other institutional aspects of the community influence firms (e.g., 
Bansal, 2005; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Battilana, 
2009; Marquis et al., 2007; McVeigh & Sobolewski, 2007). Additionally, researchers 
have yet to develop theory about how community-level logics are internalized into 
organizations, leading to heterogeneity in organizational behavior even when firms are 
embedded in the same higher level logics.  
While there are a variety of definitions for ideology, most suggest that ideology 
is a collection of beliefs about what the proper order of society is, and how it can be 
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achieved (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Inherent within this definition is the role of 
social groups, which as a collective provide a framework for individuals and 
organizations to help them both interpret their environment and know how to act 
(Denzau & North, 1994; Gupta et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2009). Thus, ideology is shared, it 
helps actors to interpret their social world, and it provides guidelines for action. 
Although ideologies have at times been applied to broad cultural perspectives, it is 
important to realize that doing so results in an apolitical approach that normalizes and 
neutralizes ideology (Beyer, Dunbar, & Meyer, 1988; Meyer, Sahlin, Ventresca, & 
Walgenbach, 2009). Rather, ideology at lower levels is related to political contests for 
power between social groups, and as such is based on conflict at both the level of the 
underlying values and ideas as well as at the group level (Mutch, 2009). 
Drawing on the theoretical model proposed by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and 
Sulloway (2003), which views ideology as motivated social cognition, these differences 
in ideological perspectives between individuals can be explained by factors that come 
both from within the person, as well as exist in the individual’s social environment. 
Thus, ideology is influenced both by characteristics of the individuals themselves (i.e., 
psychological and physiological) (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Tomkins, 1963), as well 
as the culture that the individuals are embedded in (Jost et al., 2009). These individual 
characteristics have been shown to be heritable, present during early childhood, and 
relatively stable in individuals over their lifespan (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Block 
& Block, 2006).  
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While a focus on political ideology may seem at first to be theoretically and 
methodologically unconnected to organizational action, there are several reasons why 
the political ideology of constituents is applicable for predicting the strategic actions of 
SLOs. First, ideological self-placement was found to be a strong predictor of voting 
intentions in the time period from 1974 to 2004, meaning that people who identify with a 
particular party are much more likely to vote for candidates from that party (Jost, 2006). 
As a result, both the party of the elected official and the voting patterns of the general 
public are an indication of at least some of the underlying values and identities of the 
populace that are stakeholders for the organization. Second, some scholars have 
suggested that Americans in general are not “well-informed about politics, do not hold 
many of their views very strongly, and are not ideological” (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 
2006: 19). However, research has shown that over the last 40 years, there has been a 
substantial polarization of both the political elites (e.g., officeholders, candidates, and 
activists) and the general public as Democratic party members have been moving farther 
to the left and Republican party members have been moving to the right (Abramowitz & 
Saunders, 2008; Hetherington, 2001). Both points suggest that there is a strong tie 
between political ideology and the way that people vote on issues such as the 
environment, the economy, and many other political arenas governed by elected 
officials.  
Internalization of Values 
Ideology at the community-level, which represents the values and beliefs of its 
members, can be internalized and adopted into organizations through two related 
 57 
 
mechanisms: motivated cognition and logic of appropriateness. Motivated cognition is 
similar to the idea of “elective affinity” used by Max Weber’s analysis of how people 
adopt ideas, and conversely, how ideas adopt people (Gerth & Mills, 1970). To clarify, 
motivated cognition allows individuals to choose what values and ideas that they accept 
through forces that may not be visible to them. However, it also allows for values to, in 
effect, “choose” individuals or groups. As individuals make decisions, they engage in 
cognitive processes that allow them to justify making decisions that align with their 
personal values, even when they are acting on behalf of others, such as in a managerial 
capacity (Gupta et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2009). In the context of entrepreneurship, as 
managers of organizations make decisions on what opportunities to pursue, the personal 
values of the manager will likely influence what the manager decides to do.  
While motivated cognition describes how personal values influence decisions, 
logic of appropriateness describes how the individuals within that organization try to 
interpret what the prevailing values of the organization are, and then adjust their 
decisions to try and follow the collective priorities of the organization (March & Olsen, 
2004). Thus, even if the personal values of the individual may not align with the values 
of the organization, the individual will likely act in ways that are in alignment with the 
organization’s values (Ocasio, 1999). For SLOs which are led by a political party, the 
values of the community are instantiated not only through employees that live within the 
community, but also through the leaders of the organization, who are part of the political 
elite of the community. These leaders, along with other elected officials (Converse, 
2000), party leaders (Layman & Carsey, 2002), and the media (Zaller, 1992), both lead 
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and control the political discourse in the community and the organization. As such, these 
leaders have significant incentive to align the values of the organization with those of the 
community in which the organization is embedded. Since SLOs are led by the political 
elites, and have as their primary stakeholders the constituents within their boundaries, 
the effects of political ideology are expected to influence these organizations’ values and 
subsequent actions more than for MLOs. MLOs are not as likely to respond to or allow 
community values to be internalized within the organization due to their differences in 
mission (e.g., profit driven) and leadership structure.  
Political Ideology and Market Entry 
In the United States, along with much of the western world, political ideology 
has become increasingly defined as a contest between liberal and conservative values. 
While a single left-right dimension of political ideology may seem overly simplistic, 
research has shown it to be a robust way of understanding individuals values and beliefs 
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Stanford, 1950; Poole & Rosenthal, 1984). A 
substantial body of research has linked this ideological debate between liberal and 
conservative to two interrelated topics: change versus tradition, and equality versus 
inequality (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981; Erikson & Tedin, 2015; Jost, Fitzsimons, & 
Kay, 2004; Lakoff, 2010; Scheffler, 2010; Wilson & Patterson, 1968). With respect to 
political philosophy conservatism is known as a positional ideology in that it is a 
reaction to challenges to traditions, institutions and authority (Muller, 2001). Within the 
framework of moral foundations theory, which characterizes people and ideologies along 
five distinct dimensions (i.e.,Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, 
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Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity), liberals tend to rate highly on the Harm/Care 
and Fairness/Reciprocity dimensions, leading them to focus on promoting actions that 
include individual choice (as opposed to abiding by existing institutions), promoting 
equality and poverty alleviation (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009). Conservatives on the 
other hand, have less variation between the five dimensions, so that none of the 
dimensions dominate the others. This results in conservatives being more likely to 
balance supporting individual liberty with defending traditional institutions and authority 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).  
Over time, political ideology in the United States has come to be synonymous 
with the Democratic and Republican parties (Jost, 2006). The Democratic Party has 
typically been associated with liberals, who focus on issues of social, economic and 
political equality, which has often led to their push for change from traditional 
arrangements (Jost, Basevich, Dickson, & Noorbaloochi, 2015). Such an openness to 
change, along with a willingness to challenge existing hierarchies and authority 
structures result in SLOs in Democratic-led areas to be more willing to enter new 
markets. Furthermore, SLOs in Democratic areas will likely have greater awareness and 
motivation for social equality which will result in the organizations being more 
supportive of pro-environmental actions, even if it increases the scope of existing public 
sector entities or significant change for the organization (Gupta et al., 2017; Shipan & 
Lowry, 2001). As a result, SLOs in Democratic areas will be more likely to enter new 
markets when there is an opportunity to protect the environment.   
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On the other side of the ideological divide is conservatism, which in the United 
States is predominantly represented by the Republican Party (Jost et al., 2009; Layman, 
Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006). Previous hypotheses have suggested that SLOs will be less 
likely than MLOs to enter new markets. However, when these organizations are located 
in Republican dominated communities, then they will become even more unlikely to 
enter the market. As mentioned, resistance to change and a tendency to accept inequality 
have also long been core traits of conservative ideologies, such as those espoused by the 
Republican party (Rossiter, 1968). Members of this party tend to be less open to new 
experiences (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008), more conscientious about duty and 
order (Jost et al., 2003), in addition to being more focused on managing uncertainty and 
risks in their environment (Carney et al., 2008; Christensen et al., 2014). These 
conservative traits lead to a tendency to rationalize and defend existing institutions such 
as religion, marriage, or government, particularly when they promote hierarchical 
authority (Muller, 2001). Republicans also are more likely to focus on abiding by the 
current rules and norms instantiated within the dominant institutions (Maccoby, 1972). 
As a result, Republican-led SLOs are also more likely to view entering a new market as 
a significant departure from the organization’s current scope of services (Fromm, 2013).  
Additionally, a lack of emphasis on social and environmental equality makes it 
more likely that environmentally friendly pursuits or reforms by SLOs will be resisted 
by Republicans (Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001; Shipan & Lowry, 2001). Such a 
resistance to pro-social or pro-environmental actions by Republicans occurs for three 
primary reasons: (1) conservative leaders are responsive to the interests of business and 
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industry, which may incur an additional cost as a result of the organization’s action that 
could increase the taxes or fees charged by the organization, (2) environmentally 
friendly actions would lead to an increase in scope of services provided by a public 
sector organization, and (3) these actions require pursuing a new market that is a change 
from the status quo (Dunlap, 1975). Such resistance is particularly salient for SLOs, 
which as a result of the political leadership, increased number of community 
stakeholders, and a focus on compliance with regulatory standards, are more likely to be 
influenced by these values. As SLOs proceed through their formal decision-making 
processes, which offers both leaders and stakeholders significant opportunities to oppose 
projects, those organizations located in areas with Republican values will be less likely 
to approve the project.  
This ideology-based reluctance by political elites to increase uncertainty for the 
organization, enlarge government, and/or support environmentally favorable actions 
means that SLOs in Republican-led areas are less likely to pursue new market 
opportunities, particularly if those opportunities provide environmental benefits.  
Hypothesis 7: Republican ideology will moderate the relationship between SLOs 
and market entry such that SLOs located in communities with Republican 
ideology will be even less likely to enter a new market than MLOs. 
 
Political Ideology and Risk-taking 
SLOs are also less likely to take risk during market entry when they are in 
Republican-led areas. Research has found that political conservatism reflects a core 
psychological trait that seeks to reduce uncertainty and minimize threats (Haidt et al., 
2009). This is an individual level need that is supported by a large body of evidence, and 
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helps to explain why Republicans are more likely to resist change and support existing 
traditions and institutions (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost et al., 2003). People who are 
conservative are more likely to fear losses, ambiguity, and uncertainty, while placing 
greater emphasis on financial security (Jost et al., 2015). As a result, SLOs that are in 
Republican-led areas are more likely to have a lower risk tolerance than SLOs in 
Democratic led areas. Consistent with this argument, recent research on political 
ideology and risk has found the Republican managers are more likely to avoid tax fraud 
(Christensen et al., 2014) and be more conservative in the way that they pursue 
innovation (Hutton et al., 2015). Further, Republican-led organizations are more likely to 
be careful, practical, and methodical in their approach to market entry (Block & Block, 
2006; Fromm, 2013). Thus, despite the increased time and effort required to make 
decisions to enter markets, SLOs in Republican-dominated areas that do enter the market 
will be less likely to take risk because risk-taking can endanger the organization’s 
financial and social positions should the project fail. 
While SLOs in Republican-led areas are likely to have leaders that are responsive 
to the political ideologies of the electorate, the effect of conservative values is not 
limited to only the leaders of the organization. As mentioned before, the logic of 
appropriateness suggests that as leaders of the organization establish the organizations 
values through emphasizing specific agendas, allocating financial resources, and setting 
specific policies and guidelines, members of the organization will be more likely to 
respond and act on those values even if they do not internalize them (Van Maanen & 
Schein, 1979). Thus, even if employees do not identify with conservative values, they 
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are more likely to being risk averse in their work. Such an aversion to risk at all levels of 
the organization is likely to result in SLOs becoming less willing to take risk as they 
enter a new market when they are located in a Republican-led area. 
Hypothesis 8: Republican ideology will moderate the relationship between SLOs 
and risk-taking such that SLOs located in communities with Republican ideology 
will take even less risk as they enter new markets. 
 
Political Power Asymmetry and Market Entry 
Within the concept and definition of ideology is an inherent political power 
struggle between two parties or groups. However, independent of what party dominates 
the ideological underpinnings of the community is the level of power asymmetry 
between constituents. Considering the extent to which a single party holds a political 
majority in the community provides a better understanding of the degree to which there 
is asymmetry in power, as any group that holds a significant level of power can enact 
changes and decisions more easily than when there is a low level of power asymmetry.  
In communities where there exists a large majority of the population that 
identifies with the values espoused by a particular party (high power asymmetry), there 
is less ambiguity for individuals and organizations about what is acceptable behavior to 
the community. High power asymmetry means that one of the political parties has a 
dominant presence (i.e., large amount of power) in the community. As I previously 
discussed, SLOs are more likely to be influenced by the values in the community, as 
these organizations are not only led by political leaders, but there are multiple structural 
mechanisms to allow for stakeholders in the community to have input into organizational 
decisions. As a result, the existence of a dominant political party in the community 
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provides a greater degree of goal and role clarity for the leaders of the organization 
(Pandey & Wright, 2006), as there is less conflict about what the values and beliefs in 
the community are. As discussed above, the dominance of either party in a community 
can lead to greater alignment in goals and activities by the organization with the 
underlying values of either the Democratic or Republican party depending on which 
party the political leaders identify with. 
However, in areas where there is a greater degree of contestation (low power 
asymmetry), both the leaders and employees of SLOs are more likely to have 
interactions with stakeholders who hold fundamentally different views of what is 
appropriate for the organization to do (Rogers & Molnar, 1976). These interactions can 
create significant ambiguity about what the goals and actions of the organization should 
be. Further, since neither party holds a clear majority, the political body overseeing these 
organizations (e.g., city council, board) is less likely to have a party with enough 
political power to make decisions that officials from the other party are ideologically 
opposed to. In other words, the formal decision-making process that SLOs have makes it 
more difficult for decisions to be approved when there is significant disagreement within 
the leadership. Both of these factors increase the likelihood that SLOs in areas with low 
power asymmetry will have a harder time getting the market entry decision approved by 
their leaders.  
Additionally, most terms for these officials are two years, which in areas with 
highly contested political seats may lead to frequent changes in leaders and subsequent 
organizational policies within the decision-making cycle of these projects. Such changes 
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can lead to delays or even termination of the proposed projects, again extending the 
likelihood that the project fails to be approved during the decision-making process. 
These changes in leadership can also lead staff members to become less willing to 
champion a project, knowing that even while they have the support of the current 
leadership group, the leadership will likely change significantly in terms of values during 
the next election cycle. Thus, while SLOs are typically slower to make decisions and are 
less likely to pursue new market opportunities, they become even less likely to enter the 
renewable power generation market when there is a high degree of power asymmetry 
between parties. MLOs on the other hand, are not as susceptible to influence by 
community values, as the leadership positions are not political in nature, nor are they 
subject to approval by community stakeholders. As a result, the degree of political power 
asymmetry is not likely to influence MLOs in the same way that SLOs are. 
Hypothesis 9: Political power asymmetry will moderate the relationship between 
SLOs and market entry such that SLOs in communities with low political power 
asymmetry will be even less likely than MLOs to enter new markets. 
 
Political Power Asymmetry and Risk-taking 
While low levels of political power asymmetry can lead to decreased market 
entry by SLOs, high levels of political power asymmetry in the community are expected 
to be associated with higher risk-taking as SLOs enter new markets. Social psychology 
research on group decision-making provides some insights into why this might be the 
case. This research suggests that there are inherent individual and group level biases 
within the leadership that can increase the amount of risk-taking by an organization 
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(Baron & Kerr, 2003). SLOs located in communities with high power asymmetry are 
more likely to increase their risk-taking behaviors for several reasons.  
First, these organizations are more likely to experience group polarization 
(Isenberg, 1986; Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969) when there is a high majority of a single 
party. Group polarization is the tendency of a group meeting to amplify members’ pre-
meeting positions (Zhu, 2013). Group polarization occurs in part because group 
members are more confident in expressing arguments that support their pre-meeting 
positions, as opposed to expressing arguments that are counter to their positions (Vohs, 
Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005).  
Group polarization is also more likely to occur in organizations with a 
controlling political party because individuals tend to avoid challenging the prevailing 
position as there may be social risks in doing so (Moscovici & Doise, 1994). For SLOs, 
the leadership structure does not place the final decision-making authority in the hands 
of a single person, as is often the case within MLOs. At a minimum, there is a group or 
quorum of at least five people that vote on each action taken by the organization. This 
vote takes place during a meeting open to members of the community, who also have the 
opportunity to share their opinions on the proposed action prior to the vote by the 
governing body. Consequently, SLOs, who must go through this formal feedback and 
voting process several times before the project is completed, are much more likely to be 
susceptible to group polarization biases. As a result, communities that have a high power 
asymmetry (i.e., large majority of one party), are more likely to experience group 
polarization, which can lead to increased risk-taking.  
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The second reason that SLOs are more likely to increase in risk-taking when 
there is high power asymmetry is due to a greater tendency to engage in groupthink 
(Janis, 1972). Research on groupthink suggests that when there is a large majority of a 
political party in a decision-making body, the group is more likely to engage in 
groupthink (i.e., conformity to group values and ethics) when members are part of a 
highly cohesive group (Baron & Kerr, 2003). Again, since SLOs are led by a political 
body that is required to review and vote on each major decision by the organization, 
these organizations are particularly susceptible to groupthink biases. Political bodies that 
have a high majority of members of the same political party (high power asymmetry) are 
more likely to support one another’s position (Hetherington, 2001), which limits the 
amount of conflict and debate that occurs during the public decision-making process.  
Thus, when a decision has been made to enter a new market, members of the 
controlling party are more likely to support the project as it is more likely to align with 
the underlying values and identities of the group (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). For SLOs 
located in communities with high political power asymmetry, the group decision-making 
biases of group polarization and groupthink will lead to a greater amount of risk-taking 
by SLOs.  
Hypothesis 10: Political power asymmetry will moderate the relationship 
between SLOs and risk-taking such that SLOs in communities with low power 
asymmetry will engage in a lower-level of risk as they enter a new market. 
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3. METHODS 
I test my hypotheses on the population of landfills in the U.S. falling under the 
US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 1996 methane reduction rule developed 
under the authority of the Clean Air Act. This includes any landfill in the U.S. with a 
design capacity of at least 2.5 million metric tons and at least 2.5 million cubic meters of 
waste in place. Data for the population were gathered from 1970-2014 and were 
obtained from a variety of sources. Data on landfills and their power-generating 
activities were primarily gathered from the EPA and the US Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). Voting data were gathered from the U.S. Library of Congress.  
The environmental voting records of U.S. Congressional members were gathered 
at the Congressional district level using data from the League of Conservation Voters. 
The pro-business voting records of U.S. Congressional members were gathered at the 
Congressional district level using data from the United States Chamber of Commerce. 
Additional data on PPPs was hand collected from organizations websites, news stories, 
and personal communication with staff in the organizations. Data for the control 
variables such as population and per capita income were gathered from the U.S. Census 
Bureau. Information on retail energy pricing and estimated capital costs as well as 
operating and maintenance (O&M) costs were obtained from the US Energy Information 
Agency (EIA). Landfills with missing data were removed from the dataset, resulting in a 
final sample of 1,899 landfills with 694 (37%) actually entering the renewable energy 
market.  
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Data 
Dependent Variables 
Market Entry – As discussed earlier, the dependent variable market entry is a 
dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the landfill entered the market for renewable power 
generation in a given year, zero otherwise. Data for this variable were obtained from the 
EPA’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP) database, which includes such 
information as the date the landfill opened, its design and current capacity, methane 
estimates, and data on when and how they collect the gas and produce renewable energy. 
It is important to note that landfills may undertake several renewable energy projects, 
which are typically expansions using the same technology and consist of adding 
additional generation units. In cases where the landfill had multiple projects, I coded the 
landfill as entering the market in the first year that they generated any power using 
methane (i.e., first year of methane generation).  
Risk at Market Entry (Total capacity installed divided by the total potential 
power generation capacity) – The dependent variable risk is the percent of actual 
generation capacity installed, compared to the total potential capacity available based on 
the predicted or measured methane output from the landfill. Data for this variable was 
generated from the EPA’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP) database using 
the amount of gas utilized in the initial project. This variable was calculated as a 
continuous variable and ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates that the firm took no 
risk, and 100 indicates that the organization utilized all of the produced methane in the 
initial project.  
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Independent Variables  
Organization Logic – The type of organization logic is determined using the type 
of organization that owns the landfill. Organizations that were government in nature 
(e.g., special service district, municipal, county, or state), were labeled as a state logic 
organization. Organizations that were businesses (e.g., privately owned or corporations), 
were labeled as a market logic organization. The organization logic variable is 
dichotomous and was assigned a 1 if the owner of the landfill is a state logic based 
organization (SLO). Landfills owned by a market logic based organization (MLO) were 
given a 0 for this variable.  
Moderator Variables  
PPP – The variable PPP was measured from the EPA LMOP dataset and is a 1 if 
a public sector organization is the owner of the landfill and a private sector organization 
is managing the landfill, 0 otherwise. This variable indicates that the public sector owner 
does not manage the landfill and has contracted it out to a private sector party. It should 
be noted that I focus on SLO-owned landfills that are operated and managed by an MLO 
because there are only three landfills in the population that are owned by an MLO and 
managed by an SLO. Data were structured to reflect the year that the organization 
entered into a PPP. For example, if a landfill entered the market for renewable power in 
1980, but did not enter into a PPP until 1984, then this variable was given a value of 0 in 
any year as the PPP was not in place when the SLO entered the market. However, if the 
PPP was established in 1976, then this variable was given a value of 1 in the years from 
1976 to 1984, as the PPP was in effect in the year the SLO entered the market. In order 
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to verify that landfills were indeed part of a PPP, each landfill was contacted via phone 
or email in January and February of 2018. This process resulted in 97 landfills being 
labeled as a PPP. In short, PPP was given a value of 1 if the landfill was part of a PPP, 
and 0 if the landfill was not part of a PPP.  
Size – The variable, organizational size, is a measure of the total design volume 
of the landfill in cubic feet. It is calculated using the design area and estimated depth 
provided by the permits submitted to the EPA and stored in the LMOP database. While 
it does not provide a dynamic measure of landfill size, it does provide significant insight 
into the overall design size and capacity of the organization. When a landfill is designed 
and built, the size is based upon current and projected demands. Logically, the bigger the 
design capacity of the landfill, the larger the associated capacity of the organization to 
build, maintain and operate it. This variable was log transformed to help the distribution 
be more symmetrical.  
Political Ideology – The variable, political ideology, is dichotomous and is coded 
as 1 if the Congressional member elected to the United States House of Representatives 
from that district in each Congressional term was a Republican party member. The 
variable was given a value of 0 if the member is a member of the Democratic party. For 
example, if the Congressional member was a Republican during the 113th U.S. Congress, 
the variable was given the value of 1 during the years of 2013 and 2014. While past 
research has used a state-level measure that is an estimated score based on ideological 
voting records (Sine & Lee, 2009), I use a local Congressional district level measure, 
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allowing for a greater representation of community ideological preferences of 
constituents within that district.  
Political Power Asymmetry – The variable, power asymmetry, is a continuous 
variable from 0 to 100 that reflects the amount of political conflict or disagreement in a 
given area. In areas where one party controls a large majority of the vote, then the 
amount of political power asymmetry is low. The variable is constructed by taking the 
absolute value of the difference in voting percentage between Republican and 
Democratic candidates. Voting percentage is the percent of the total vote that is given to 
each party. For example, if the percent of total votes that goes to the Republican party is 
90, and the percent of the vote that goes to the Democratic candidate is 10, then the 
power asymmetry variable is 80. If the percent of the total vote for a Republican 
candidate is 45 and the percent of vote that goes to Democratic candidates is 55, then the 
power asymmetry variable is 10. If this variable is close to 0, then in these districts, there 
is a low amount of power asymmetry as the vote is split between ideological parties, 
leading to greater ambiguity and conflict for the organization. This variable only looks at 
the magnitude of asymmetry, not at the direction, as the mechanisms hypothesized did 
not rely on a particular ideology.  
Control Variables  
Nearby Landfills: In order to capture the influence that the cultural cognitive 
environment has on a landfill’s decisions to enter the market, I calculated how many 
other landfills in the state were generating power for each year in the study. While it may 
seem that aggregating this on a state level would be less representative than doing it 
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based on geographic distance, it is important to remember that landfills are regulated by 
the state in which they reside. While the EPA does have authority to regulate all 
landfills, the EPA authorizes each state to provide the regulatory compliance oversight, 
leading to significant state level influences on landfills. Additionally, such a state level 
influence leads to the formation of industry association chapters being organized 
utilizing state lines, instead of solely by geographic distance. Consequently, it is 
expected that having landfills within the same state would have a greater effect than 
having a landfill in relatively close proximity (<150 miles) that is located in another 
state.  
Payback: The variable used to represent the economic opportunity is payback, 
and is the expected time in years for a landfill to recoup its costs should it engage in 
power generation.  The methodology includes calculating the expected generation 
capacity and the associated capital and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs for 
each type of technology, as well as the average retail price at which the utility would be 
able to sell the power. The expected power generation capacity was calculated using 
information in the LMOP database, which includes information on the megawatt 
capacity on existing installations.  Where that was not reported, the generation capacity 
was estimated using several other variables in the database.  The first variables used 
were those that indicated how much methane the landfill was generation such as the total 
gas flared or gathered in the collection system.  However, as some landfills also lacked 
this information, the amount of solid waste present (in tons) in each facility was used to 
estimate the expected methane output, which was then converted to a power output.   
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The estimated capital and O&M costs were obtained from an EIA report on 
power generation that included costs for generating power at landfills (United States 
Energy Information Administration, 2013). While there are many types of technologies 
that could be used to generate power, the most common ones in use include the internal 
combustion engine (large and small), microturbine, and gas turbine.  While there may be 
differences between those categories, the costs are similar enough that the EIA groups 
them within the above categories together for preliminary cost estimating purposes. The 
cost estimates provided by the EIA are based on the generation capacity of the plant, 
allowing for costs to be scaled according to size.  As the construction costs in this report 
were finalized in 2012, I adjusted the prices for each year in the study using the 
Engineering News Record Construction Cost Index (CCI). The CCI is widely used in the 
construction industry as a measure of the average change in the cost of building and 
construction projects and are based off of a 20-city national average of construction 
materials and labor costs. It has been collected since 1913, allowing me to adjust the 
2012 costs in the EIA report to better represent expected construction costs for each year 
in the study. One disadvantage of the index is that it does not allow for comparison of 
costs between geographic locations. However, the EIA 2013 report also provided cost 
estimates for facilities in each state, allowing for a direct comparison of how these costs 
varied between states. This was used to adjust the cost estimates of landfills within states 
to better reflect regional variations in construction material and labor costs, as well as 
variations in land and permitting expenses. 
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The average retail price of electricity was obtained from EIA form 861, which 
provides annual prices for electricity in several sectors for each state. It is recognized 
that when a landfill generates power, they are generally not able to sell that power at full 
commercial value as the incumbent power distributer and generator incur costs 
regardless of who generates the power.  Thus, it was assumed that the retail price that the 
landfills would be able to sell the power at would be equal to the industrial price, which 
over the study period has been 62% of the average residential retail price and 71% of the 
average commercial price available to consumers. This is a conservative estimate as the 
industrial price has typically been significantly lower than commercial and residential 
prices.  
Using this information together, the total capital and annual O&M costs for each 
landfill were calculated, as well as the expected annual revenue. This was then used to 
calculate the average payback period in years.  Consequently, larger values of payback 
result in decreased economic opportunity as it takes longer to recover the initial 
investment in the proposed landfill renewable energy project. 
Population: The variable, population, was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau 
and is the total population at the county level (in millions) for each observation period. 
This variable is log transformed.  
Per Capita Income: The relative prosperity of each constituency using the per 
capita income provided by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. This variable is the 
average income per person in the county in thousands of dollars.  
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Analysis 
I utilize two different methods of analysis in this study, as each dependent 
variable (i.e., market entry and risk-taking) is specified by different models. Table 2 
shows summary statistics and the correlation table for each of the variables in the model. 
There are a few variables that have values that are concerning. For example, PPP has a 
mean of 0.03, which is due to the low number of landfills that are part of a PPP. This 
may present a problem for some analytical techniques, and should be considered in 
selecting a particular method. There are also some high correlations between control 
variables (e.g., per capita income and EPAleg96 = 0.750), although the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) are all under 3, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue.  
Market Entry – Survival Analysis 
As market entry is an event, and I am interested in looking at the hazard of each 
landfill experience the event, I utilize survival analysis to analyze these models. For 
simplicity, I first begin by using the Cox proportional hazards approach (Cox, 1972), 
which assumes that the hazard ratio (i.e., the probability that an organization experiences 
the event of interest) is constant over time. This model is often called a partial or semi-
parametric model. It should be noted that each landfill has a well-defined beginning 
point, as well as a defined ending point. As a result, with regard to censored data, the 
data in this population are right censored, meaning that for some landfills, they did not 
experience the event during the period of study from 1970-2014 (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & 
May, 2011).  
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Table 2 Summary statistics and correlation table 
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) Logic 0.66 0.47 0 1.00 1.00       
              
(2) PPP 0.03 0.16 0 1.00 0.072*  1.000      
              
(3) Size 13.64 3.83 4.79 23.29 -0.048* -0.010*  1.000    
              
(4) Republican 0.54 0.50 0 1.00 0.007  0.020*  -0.017*  1.000  
              
(5) Power Asymmetry 64.43 26.43 0 100.00 -0.006 0.002 0.008* 0.034* 
              
(6) Population (log) 4.62 1.53 -0.38 9.22 -0.070* 0.054* 0.141* -0.037* 
              
(7) State 29.21 15.79 1.00 56.00 0.018* -0.052* -0.031* -0.071* 
              
(8) Per Capita Income (000’s) 20.85 11.26 2.13 125.30 0.008 0.102* -0.001 0.135* 
              
(9) Nearby Generation 8.40 15.09 0 87.00 -0.003 0.098* -0.007 0.092* 
              
(10) Payback (Years) 3.77 1.37 0.85 9.82 0.107* -0.040* -0.149* 0.090* 
              
(11) EPA Legis 96 0.46 0.50 0 1.00 0.010* 0.081* -0.047 0.168* 
      1.00       
Correlations with an * are significant at p<0.05 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Logic               
                
(2) PPP               
                
(3) Size               
                
(4) Republican               
                
(5) Power Asymmetry 1.000             
                
(6) Population (log) -0.014* 1.000           
                
(7) State -0.066* -0.251* 1.000         
                
(8) Per Capita Income (000’s) 0.018* 0.144* -0.029* 1.000       
                
(9) Nearby Generation 0.006 0.268* -0.252* 0.431* 1.000     
                
(10) Payback (Years) 0.034* -0.398* 0.322* 0.263* -0.087* 1.000   
                
(11) EPA Legis 96 0.013* -0.058* 0.019* 0.753* 0.390* 0.455* 1.000  
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An important consideration in specifying a hazards model is the choice of origin 
for the starting of time. In the context of landfills, the origin of time is not clear as 
landfills are constructed and enter service at different times. Importantly, none of the 
landfills in the population entered the market for renewable power until at least 1979. 
For those landfills built after that point, I set the starting time as the year the landfill was 
built. For landfills built prior to 1979, I considered what variables or factors would 
influence the decision to enter the power generation market. Theoretically, the hazard of 
landfills entering the market for renewable power is not thought to vary strongly based 
on variables such as age, size (since all landfills in the sample are above a certain 
threshold), or other typical variables. However, from a historical point of view, the 
environmental movement that occurred in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s led 
to the passage of two significant acts of legislation that helped shape the federal 
government’s role in protecting the environment. Both the Clean Air Act (1970) and the 
Clean Water Act (1972) established the basic structure for regulation of discharged 
pollution into the nation’s air and water resources.  
As a result of this paradigm shift in the way the nation viewed the environment, 
the starting time for the analysis is set at 1970 for the 458 landfills in the population that 
began service prior to 1970 (208 of these entered the power generation market at a later 
date). As a result, it was felt that setting the starting time as 1970 allows these important 
historical conditions to have an equal effect on sample members (Allison, 2014). The 
remaining landfills in the sample have their starting time set as the year that they were 
built.  
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One of the assumptions of the proportional hazards model is that the hazards 
function is continuous, meaning that there are no tied survival times. Tied events, or 
“ties,” means that more than one observation or site experiences the event of interest in 
the same time period (Stata, 2017). As a result, the partial likelihood estimation method 
must be adjusted to account for the fact that time is not continuous. The Breslow 
approximation method, which is commonly used, becomes inaccurate if the number of 
events occurring relative to the number of sites at risk becomes large (typically 15% or 
more) (Farewel & Prentice, 1980). In those cases, the Efron method provides a better 
approximation, even though it is more computationally intensive (Allison, 2014). In 
order to account for the fact that my data has ties, where two or more landfills can 
experience the event during the same year, I looked at the percentage of how many ties 
occur in contrast with the number at risk. No year in the population had more than 6% of 
the sample experience the event, so it was felt that the Breslow approximation, which is 
the default in Stata, was appropriate.  
Proportional Hazards Assumption 
In using the Cox method for survival models, a primary assumption is that the 
hazard ratio (HR) is constant over time. This is known as the proportional hazards 
assumption, and means that each explanatory variable influences the hazard in a constant 
manner at each point in time. While some authors suggest that the use of a Cox model is 
still a satisfactory approximation even when this assumption is violated (Allison, 2014; 
Hosmer et al., 2011), I test this assumption to see if there is an interaction between time 
and a variable of interest. One common method is to calculate the Schoenfeld residuals, 
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which Stata calculates for each event and for each explanatory variable (Allison, 2014). 
For those variables whose hazards are proportional, the Schoenfeld residuals should be 
uncorrelated with any function of time. In Stata, these residuals are calculated using the 
option schoenfeld(sch*) scaledsch(sca*) with the stcox command, and the test of the 
proportionality of the model is performed afterward with the command stphtest, log 
detail. The results of the Schoenfeld residual test show that the test is not significant for 
our main predictor variable, where the residual is 0.4386, suggesting that the 
proportional hazards assumption has not been violated (Hosmer et al., 2011). Another 
way is to look at the plot of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for each type of logic over 
time, which is shown in Figure 1. In this figure, a predominantly horizontal line indicates 
that the proportional hazards assumption is generally not being violated by the overall 
model (i.e., it is not variable specific). Again, due to the fact that the Cox method is so 
robust, I use it for my analysis.  
Empirical Model 
Our theoretical model includes the primary relationship between the logics of an 
organization and their likelihood of entering a new market. It also includes several 
potential moderators or “effect modifiers” of the relationship that I test in later models. 
This base model has a log-hazard function in the form of:  
𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥,𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏,𝛽𝛽) = ln[ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)] + 𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽2 + 𝑏𝑏𝛽𝛽3 + 𝜖𝜖 
where 𝑡𝑡 represents time in years, the primary risk factor is represented by 𝑥𝑥, which can 
vary with time 𝑡𝑡, as well as control variables that are represented by 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏, and each 𝛽𝛽 
is the estimated adjustor or effect. 𝜖𝜖 is the error term for the model. Models with control 
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variables only, as well as with independent variables were run in Stata. I then ran a 
separate model with each interaction, as well as a final model with all interaction terms 
as a rough form of robustness test for the results. The interaction models have a log-
hazard function of: 
𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏,𝛽𝛽) = ln[ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)] + 𝑥𝑥𝛽𝛽1(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽2 + 𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽3(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽4 + 𝜖𝜖 
where 𝑦𝑦 is the potential moderating variable and 𝑥𝑥𝑦𝑦 is the interaction term.  
 
Figure 1 Schoenfeld residual plot for the Logic variable 
 
 
Risk-taking – Bayesian Linear Regression 
Models with the dependent variable of risk-taking were run using a Bayesian 
linear regression approach. Bayesian inference has significantly improved over the last 
50 years, while becoming practical for researchers to use in the last 10-15 years due to 
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advances in computers and software that allow for estimation of models that do not have 
direct mathematical solution. Bayesian inference estimates model parameters using only 
data that is actually observed and allows for prior information that the researcher has to 
be used to influence the final estimation. An important difference between Bayesian and 
null hypothesis significant testing (NHST) inference approaches is in their use of 
probability for making inferences. Bayesian inference provides the researcher with the 
direct probability of parameters, hypotheses, models, or other events of interest (Gelman 
et al., 2013; Kaplan, 2014; Kruschke, Aguinis, & Joo, 2012), because it generates 
posterior distributions for unknown parameters.  
For the models with the Risk dependent variable, there is no prior information 
about the risk-taking propensity of state logic based organizations, so I use an 
uninformative prior for each parameter in the regression. An uninformative prior allows 
the data in hand to dominate the prior distributions, meaning that the estimation results 
will be similar to the results given using an ordinary linear regression method. Should 
informative priors have been available (based on past information and studies), then the 
prior would have a larger effect on the posterior distributions, leading to results that 
could vary substantially from OLS or other NHST methods.  
For the models in this dissertation, parameters in each model were assigned prior 
distributions with a normal distribution (mean of 0 and a variance of 10,000). For the 
error term, I use an inverse gamma distribution with a shape of 0.01 and a scale of 0.01. 
A burn-in period of 10,000 was selected, with an additional 40,000 iterations using a 
Monte Carlo Markov Chains (MCMC) approximation method that derives posterior 
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probability distributions for each parameter in the model (Stata v.15 was used for all 
models). It should also be noted that VIFs for these models did not exceed 2.1 for any 
variable. Additionally, the Bayesian approach used for the analysis does not assume a 
normal error term as ordinary linear regression does. While each of the prior assigned to 
these variables were normal distributions, the priors are extremely uninformative (i.e., 
shape is very flat), so the models should be unaffected by the selection of a normally 
distributed prior for any variable, regardless of its actual distribution.  
Since MCMC involves numerous iterations, convergence and autocorrelation are 
potentially significant issues for Bayesian models using this type of estimation method. 
In order to reduce the amount of auto-correlation across lags of the iteration process, a 
thinning step of ten was used. In order to verify that the process produced posterior 
distributions that were well behaved, several model diagnostics were checked. Typically, 
there are four main diagnostics that are reviewed. Figure 2 shows an example for the 
variable Logic in the base model with Risk as the dependent variable. In the tope left 
corner, a trace plot looks at how stable the iterations for the coefficient’s posterior 
distribution are. Convergence around a value is a sign of a stable analysis. In this case, 
there does not appear to be too much to worry about as the MCMC process seems fairly 
stable in estimating the model. On the bottom left corner of Figure 2 is the plot of 
autocorrelation across lags. As the MCMC process proceeds, the autocorrelation should 
ideally reduce to near 0, or at least below 0.1. With the thinning step that I specified 
(10), the autocorrelation does not appear to be a problem. The next two diagnostics 
include looking at the posterior distribution itself. The top right plot in Figure 2 shows a 
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histogram of the posterior distribution for the Logic parameter, while the bottom right 
plot shows the smoothed density distribution. The histogram is unimodal and appears to 
be close to symmetrical about the mode. The density function is quite smooth, and 
shows that there were not any major changes in the distribution as the estimation 
progressed, which would have suggested that the model did not have enough time to 
converge. Over all, the diagnostics appear to show a well-behaved estimation process, 
meaning that the estimated posterior distributions are valid.   
 
Figure 2 – Bayesian model diagnostic plot for the Logic parameter in model 7 
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4. RESULTS 
Models 1 to 6 have as their dependent variable Entry, while Models 7 through 12 
use Risk as the dependent variable. As a result, hypotheses for models with Entry as the 
dependent variable are reported first, meaning that the hypotheses will be reported out of 
order. Means are reported for all posterior distributions. Results for Models 1-6 are 
presented in Table 3. Model 1 provides baseline results for Hypothesis 1, including all 
control variables. Models 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide the results for each proposed moderator 
(i.e., PPP, Size, Republican, and Power Asymmetry) with Entry as the dependent 
variable. Model 6 includes all interactions simultaneously for the Entry dependent 
variable, allowing us to see how the results vary when including all the proposed 
interactions in the model. Since these models look at the likelihood of Entry, results 
include hazard ratios (HR), p values, and confidence intervals (CI).  
For the lower-order effect of Logic on Risk, which was analyzed in Model 1 (see 
Table 3), results indicate that the relationship between Logic and Entry is negative and 
significant [HR=0.659, p<0.01, CI=(0.566, 0.767)], supporting Hypothesis 1 that SLOs 
will be less likely to enter the market for renewable power generation than MLOs. In 
fact, SLOs are 34% less likely to enter the market than MLOs over the course of the 
study period.  
Model 2 in Table 3 looks at the interaction of PPPs with Logic and how that 
influences Entry. That relationship is not significant [HR=1.470, p>0.10, CI=(0.563, 
3.840)]. Because interactions between two dichotomous variables can present challenges 
(Darlington & Hayes, 2016), I examined a two-group analysis as well. This analysis  
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Table 3 – Cox Model Results for Models 1-6 (Entry as the DV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Entry Entry Entry Entry Entry Entry 
Logic 0.659*** 0.648*** 0.306*** 0.579*** 0.600** 0.279*** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.090) (0.070) (0.137) (0.108) 
PPP  0.786    0.901 
 
 (0.355)    (0.455) 
Size (log)   1.001   1.003 
 
  (0.015)   (0.015) 
Republican    1.107  1.068 
 
   (0.123)  (0.123) 
Power Asymmetry     1.007*** 1.007*** 
 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
PPPXLogic  1.470    1.312 
 
 (0.720)    (0.711) 
SizeXLogic   1.053***   1.048** 
 
  (0.020)   (0.020) 
RepublicanXLogic    1.234  1.224 
 
   (0.194)  (0.196) 
Power AsymmetryXLogic     1.001 1.000 
 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
Population (log) 1.235 1.238 1.237 1.239 1.246 1.251 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
State 1.020 1.020 1.020 1.020 1.021 1.021 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Percapita Income (log) 1.031 1.031 1.029 1.032 1.032 1.029 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Nearby Generation 1.003 1.003 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Payback 0.602 0.605 0.611 0.594 0.597 0.603 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
EPA Legis. 96 3.660 3.628 3.811 3.619 3.637 3.729 
 (0.485) (0.481) (0.510) (0.480) (0.481) (0.500) 
Observations 60,698 60,698 57,471 60,698 60,686 57,459 
Number of firms 1,899 1,899 1787 1,899 1,899 1,787 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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supports the finding that the interaction is not significant with Entry. Figure 3 shows the 
survival curves2 for each of the four scenarios in the interaction’s 2X2 table (i.e.,MLO 
and no PPP, MLO and PPP, SLO and no PPP, and SLO and PPP). From this plot, it 
appears that the presence of a PPP does not appear to influence the relationship between 
Logic and Entry in a meaningful way, as PPPs do not seem to significantly change the 
association between Logic and Entry, particularly for SLOs. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported.  
 
Figure 3 Survival curve for the interaction between Logic and PPP  
 
                                                 
2 Survival functions, which are shown in Figures 3-6, show the probability of survival beyond time t. They 
are distinct from hazard functions, which show the instantaneous probability that the actor of interest will 
experience the hazard or event at a particular time t. Survival plots are derived directly from hazard 
functions. 
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Model 3 in Table 3 looks at how Size moderates the relationship between Logic 
and Entry. The results show that the interaction is significant and positive, indicating that 
as Size increases, organizations with a state logic become more likely to enter a new 
market [HR=1.052, p<0.01, CI=(1.013, 1.094)]. Figure 4 shows that for MLOs, Size has 
little impact on the likelihood of Entry. However, Size has a tremendous influence on the 
relationship between SLOs and market entry, resulting in a 5% increase in the hazard of 
entry for each log unit increase in Size. As a result, I conclude that Hypothesis 5 is 
supported.  
The interaction between Logic and Republican in Model 4 (Table 3) does not 
appear to be a significant predictor of Entry, suggesting that Hypothesis 7 is not 
supported. While the relationship appears to be positive [HR=1.234, p>0.10, CI=(0.907 
to 1.680)], the interaction is not significant. However, as previously mentioned, 
interactions between two dichotomous variables can lead to difficulties in estimation. A 
two-group analysis of the interaction (Darlington & Hayes, 2016) provides a clearer 
understanding of how the moderator changes the main effect, which can be seen in 
Figure 5. For the sample with only MLOs, political ideology does not have a significant 
relationship with market entry [HR= 1.049, p>0.10, CI=(0.841, 1.309)]. However, for 
the group of SLOs, political ideology does significantly predict market entry [HR=1.394, 
p<0.01, CI=(1.116, 1.741)], indicating that SLOs based in areas led by Republican party 
leaders are almost 40% more likely to experience an entry event than SLOs based in 
Democratic led areas. Figure 5 shows the survival curves for each case. Thus, there is 
some evidence that Hypothesis 7 is supported.  
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Figure 4 Survival curve for the interaction between Logic and Size  
 
 
 
Figure 5 Survival curve for the interaction between Logic and Political Ideology  
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Model 5, which includes the interaction of Power Asymmetry and Logic, was 
positive but not significant [HR=1.001, p>0.10, CI=(0.995, 1.008)]. The results indicate 
that Hypothesis 9 is not supported. Figure 6 shows this more clearly, where although 
Logic affects an organization’s Entry, Power Asymmetry does not appear to change the 
relationship between Logic and Entry. 
Model 6 in Table 3 includes all interactions and control variables. Although my 
hypotheses are intended to be tested independently of each other, Model 6 provides a 
robustness test to determine whether the posited effects that are significant remain 
significant in a simultaneous test. Results are consistent with the other models, where the 
interaction of Logic and Size is still supported [HR=1.048, p<.05, CI=(1.008, 1.089)]. 
 
 
Figure 6 Survival curve for the interaction between Logic and Power Asymmetry (P.A.) 
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Models 7-12 have as their dependent variable the amount of Risk that these 
organizations take as they enter the market. These models are summarized in Tables 4 
(Models 7-9) and 5 (Models 10-12). As mentioned, these models use a Bayesian linear 
regression approach and include only landfills that actually enter the market. The results 
of the Bayesian model do not include p values and confidence intervals. Rather they 
provide posterior distributions that provide full inferences about the parameters of 
interest. These distributions are based almost completely on the data actually observed 
due to the lack of strong prior information. While Bayesian inference focuses on both 
estimation and testing, I first examine the means of the posterior distributions to estimate 
effect sizes, and the 95% highest posterior density interval (HDI) for additional 
estimation and reporting purposes. HDI’s are different in theory and interpretation from 
confidence intervals in NHST, as HDIs actually provide the 95% probability that the true 
parameter value falls within the range given by the HDI (Gelman et al., 2013).  
Model 7 in Table 4 is the base model with Logic as the effect of interest along 
with all control variables. I find that Logic is a meaningful predictor of Risk 
[HDI=(0.021, 0.105) with a mean of 0.062]. This suggests that SLOs who enter the 
market on average install six percent more capacity than MLOs, holding other variables 
constant. Further I am 95% confident that the true effect size falls somewhere in the 
interval from 0.021 to 0.105. This suggests support for Hypothesis 2.  
The interaction of PPPs and Logic (shown in Model 8, Table 4) is positive but 
the 95% HDI includes 0 [HDI=(-0.338, 0.255) with mean of 0.175]. As a result, I 
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conclude that I cannot accept Hypothesis 7. A two group analysis verifies that the 
interaction does not appear to be significant.  
For Model 9 (see Table 4), the interaction of Size and Logic could be 0 as the 
95% HDI includes 0, [HDI=(-0.016, 0.004) with a mean effect of -0.006]. While the 
95% HDI is close to excluding 0, a simultaneous test of all interactions (Model 12, Table 
5), indicates a negative posterior moderating relationship for Size and Logic. Once again, 
the posterior mean is essentially 0 and the HDI is largely restricted to 0. As a result, the 
evidence indicates no support for Hypothesis 6.  
The results of Model 10 in Table 5 indicates that the interaction of Republican 
and Logic is not meaningful as the 95% HDI again includes 0 [HDI=(-0.107, 0.067) with 
mean -0.021]. Thus, the posterior evidence does not support Hypothesis 8.  
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Table 4 Bayesian linear regression results for Models 7 and 8 (Risk as the DV) 
 (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Risk Risk 
 Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI 
Logic 0.064 0.021 0.105 0.062 0.018 0.107 
     
PPP    -0.025 -0.266 0.281 
      
Size (log)       
      
Republican       
      
Power Asymmetry       
      
PPPXLogic    0.018 -0.338 0.255 
     
SizeXLogic       
     
RepublicanXLogic       
     
Power AsymmetryXLogic       
     
Population (log) -0.018 -0.0345 -0.003 -0.016 -0.033 0.000 
     
State 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
     
Percapita Income (log) 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.008 
     
Nearby Generation -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
     
Payback -0.052 -0.074 -.032 -0.056 -0.074 -0.035 
     
EPA Legis. 96 -0.080 -0.146 -0.005 -0.056 -0.133 0.022 
     
Constant 0.967 0.842 1.106 0.959 0.832 1.092 
     
Observations 677 677 
Credible Parameter Estimates in Bold (HDI does not include 0) 
Bayesian estimation does not provide an R-squared value, so it is not reported. 
These models include only firms that actually entered the market. 
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Table 5 Bayesian linear regression results for Models 9 and 10 (Risk as the DV) 
 (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Risk Risk 
 Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI 
Logic 0.148 0.015 0.296 0.069 0.008 0.135 
     
PPP       
      
Size (log) 0.004 -0.004 0.012    
      
Republican    0.017 -0.045 0.080 
      
Power Asymmetry       
      
PPPXLogic       
     
SizeXLogic -0.006 -0.016 0.004    
     
RepublicanXLogic    -.022 -0.107 0.067 
     
Power AsymmetryXLogic       
     
Population (log) -0.014 -0.031 0.003 -0.014 -0.027 -0.001 
     
State 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
     
Percapita Income (log) 0.005 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.008 
     
Nearby Generation -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
     
Payback -0.050 -0.070 -0.031 -0.054 -0.072 -0.035 
     
EPA Legis. 96 -0.053 -0.130 0.025 -0.053 -0.124 0.018 
     
Constant 0.867 0.688 1.042 0.929 0.832 1.031 
     
Observations 654 677 
Credible Parameter Estimates in Bold (HDI does not include 0) 
Bayesian estimation does not provide an R-squared value, so it is not reported. 
These models include only firms that actually entered the market. 
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The last interaction looks at how Power Asymmetry moderates the relationship 
between Logic and Risk (Model 11 in Table 6). This results of this model indicate that 
Power Asymmetry does not positively moderate the relationship [HDI=(0.000, 0.002) 
with mean of 0.001]. I thus conclude that Hypothesis 10 is not supported.  
Bayesian Model Testing 
An important thing to remember is that using a Bayesian approach allows us to truly 
accept a hypothesis based on our actual data, the prior distribution, and the 95% HDI 
from the posterior distribution. This is a very different conclusion than what we can say 
with an NHST approach, where we are unable to truly accept a hypothesis as we are only 
able to say that we don’t have enough evidence to reject it (Kruschke et al., 2012; 
Wagenmakers, Lee, Lodewyckx, & Iverson, 2008).  
While there are a variety of ways in Bayesian inference to formally test whether 
a hypothesis is supported, including Bayesian inference criteria (BIC) and regions of 
practical equivalence (ROPEs) (Kruschke, 2014), I use Bayes Factors (BF) to test 
hypotheses with Risk as the dependent variable. BFs are often the preferred method of 
model selection in Bayesian inference as it takes into account information about the 
priors specified in each model. BFs are calculated using the ratio of the marginal 
likelihoods between the two models being compared (Jeffreys, 1961). For each of the 
Bayesian models estimated here, I compare that model to a “base” model that does not 
include the parameter of interest. As a result, I can see if the model with the parameter of 
interest is better than the base model. I report the logarithm of each BF, meaning that  
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Table 6 Bayesian linear regression results for Models 11 and 12 (Risk as the DV) 
 (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Risk Risk 
 Mean 95% HDI Mean 95% HDI 
Logic -0.102 -0.180 -0.014 0.103 0.073 0.133 
     
PPP    -0.003 -0.026 0.021 
     
Size (log)    0.004 -0.002 0.010 
     
Republican    0.025 -0.029 0.081 
     
Power Asymmetry -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
     
PPPXLogic    0.000 -0.018 0.019 
     
SizeXLogic    -0.007 -0.013 -0.001 
     
RepublicanXLogic    -0.029 -0.077 0.020 
     
Power AsymmetryXLogic 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
     
Population (log) -0.017 -0.031 -0.001 -0.013 -0.026 -0.001 
     
State 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
     
Percapita Income (log) 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.007 
     
Nearby Generation -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
     
Payback -0.054 -0.073 -0.036 -0.050 -0.070 -0.030 
     
EPA Legis. 96 -0.061 -0.136 0.014 -0.047 -0.108 -0.017 
     
Constant 1.067 1.001 1.130 0.954 0.859 1.038 
     
Observations 677 654 
Credible Parameter Estimates in Bold (HDI does not include 0) 
Bayesian estimation does not provide an R-squared value, so it is not reported. 
These models include only firms that actually entered the market. 
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models with a positive BF are better than the base model, and models with a negative BF 
are worse (i.e. not accepted) than the base model.  
The one hypothesis with Risk as the dependent variable that has support is 
Hypothesis 2, which says that SLOs will be more likely to take risk upon market entry 
than MLOs will be. The BF for this hypothesis is -5.84, which indicates that the model 
with Logic is worse than the base model with control variables only. This means that I 
cannot accept Hypothesis 2.  
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The central research question addressed in this dissertation is How do public 
sector organizations that are based on a state logic pursue entrepreneurial 
opportunities? This dissertation has looked at market entry and risk-taking by landfill 
organizations as they enter the renewable energy market by using methane gas produced 
by the solid waste to generate power or heat. Hypotheses have focused on the type of 
organizational logic (i.e., state or market), the presence of PPPs, the size of the 
organization, and the underlying political ideology of the surrounding community. 
Results show that the type of logic underlying an organization (i.e., SLO vs MLO) has a 
consistent and important effect on the likelihood of market entry, with several important 
moderators of this relationship, including organizational size and political power 
asymmetry. In other words, SLOs behave very differently than MLOs in pursuing new 
opportunities.  
I find that several organizational-level characteristics have an important influence 
on entrepreneurial behavior. First, I find that SLOs, with their greater focus on 
regulatory compliance (as opposed to profit), are significantly less likely to enter a new 
market (~30-60%) than MLOs are (Hypothesis 1). This suggests that the underlying 
beliefs, practices and processes instantiated within an organization that has a state logic 
makes entrepreneurial behavior less likely than in an organization with a market logic. 
While the hypotheses on organizational size were originally thought to be of less 
importance than the other moderators, due to preconceived expectations that it may not 
be a strong moderator, the results for Hypothesis 5 show that these effects are actually 
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quite strong for market entry. What is perhaps most significant about these findings is 
that they suggest that SLOs that are larger in size tend to start acting more like an MLO, 
in that they become more likely to enter the market. In other words, large SLOs may 
adopt beliefs and practices that lead them to behave like an MLO.  
For hypotheses related to the community influences on organizational 
entrepreneurship, the results are more mixed. I find that the presence of Republican 
leaders in a community does moderate the relationship between ogic and market entry. 
SLOs in Republican-led communities are 22% more likely to enter the market than 
SLOs in Democratic areas (Hypothesis 7). What this means is that the values in the 
community can have an important impact on driving entrepreneurship behavior, 
particularly for SLOs. In other words, Republican party leadership is associated with 
SLOs acting more like MLOs in terms of their willingness to pursue new market 
opportunities.  
These findings have important implications for institutional theory, in that they 
establish that differences in organizational-level logics leads to varied levels of 
entrepreneurial actions. Past literature has considered how partner-level (Pahnke et al., 
2015), individual-level (Almandoz, 2014), community-level (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; 
Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007), as well as higher level logics can influence organizational 
outcomes. Yet we know little about how differences in logics at the organizational-level 
can lead to different outcomes, particularly entrepreneurship. Extending the logics 
literature in this way helps us better understand how the state logic is not just a field or 
societal level influence, but that it operates at the organizational-level in important ways 
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that have gone unconsidered by past literature. This dissertation shows that organizations 
that are based on a state logic have different values and practices that make them less 
likely to engage in new market opportunities. Taking a configurational perspective thus 
allows me to shed light on how these differences between SLOs and MLOs influences 
market entry by these organizations (Perry & Rainey, 1988), as well as how important 
organization and community-level characteristics and values influence their behavior.  
My dissertation also contributes to the growing literature on how political 
ideology influences firm outcomes. Prior literature has typically focused on how the 
ideology of the CEO (Boivie et al., 2011), directors (Almandoz & Tilcsik, 2015; Gupta 
& Wowak, 2017), and other senior managers (Christensen et al., 2014) influences 
important firm outcomes. However, to date, this work has failed to consider that the 
mechanisms through which community values such as the prevailing political ideology 
can be internalized by the organization, which then ultimately influence individual and 
firm behavior. The idea that logics and values at the community-level also influence firm 
entrepreneurial actions also has important implications for institutional theory, which has 
long acknowledged the ability of community values to influence organizations (Selznick, 
1949). This dissertation contributes to this important and growing literature , particularly 
to the institutional logics perspective, as we currently know very little about how values 
and logics at the community-level can interact with logics at the organizational or 
individual-level to influence actors behavior. What work has been done has focused on 
higher order logics (e.g., field or societal), rather than on the actors themselves (i.e., 
individuals or organizations). Understanding how values and logics at the community-
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level interact with lower-order values and logics helps explain what heterogeneity within 
organizations exists even when an organization is embedded in the same higher order 
logics.  
Another contribution that this dissertation makes theoretically is highlighting the 
important role that size can have in changing the way that an organization behaves. 
However, while prior literature has typically assumed that size influences all types of 
organizations in the same way (for a review, see Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015), 
this findings presented here show a very different story that is quite surprising: New 
market entry for organizations with a market logic seemed to be unaffected by the size of 
the organization. However, for organizations based on a state logic, size had a much 
larger impact. This suggests that increased size may lead some types of organizations to 
change practices and values, and perhaps ultimately leading to a change in 
organizational logic. Theoretically, organizational size may be a proxy for available 
resources, which would also suggest that available resources impacts organizations 
differentially depending on which types of logic the organization is based on. This idea 
is a substantial contribution to the institutional logics literature, which has yet to 
consider that resource availability may change which values and beliefs are selected 
from an actor’s environment for internalization.  
Managerial Implications – The study findings also have important implications for 
managers and policy makers. First, as policy makers make decisions about how to help 
address significant societal problems, they should carefully consider which types of 
organizations are best suited to meet social needs. While SLOs do have some significant 
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advantages in being able to address these needs, it is important to consider that policies 
which are designed to help and encourage these types of organizations should also 
consider ways in which policies might be used to help increase the likelihood of 
participation by SLOs, particularly those that may be currently operating in different 
areas. Because SLOs have such a large presence in the world, their participation in 
addressing societal issues such as climate change, infrastructure, poverty, nutrition and 
sanitation may significantly enhance the world’s progress in helping to remedy these 
important challenges.  
Second, policy makers and managers should be aware that the increased levels of 
risk-taking by these organizations may have unintended negative consequences that 
threaten the success of these ventures. Because we currently know very little about the 
long term success rate of SLOs as compared to MLOs, managers should carefully 
consider whether the increased risk-taking is both necessary and justified. A third and 
important implication for managers and policy makers is that greater attention should be 
given to helping smaller organizations based on a state logic be more active in engaging 
in new ventures. A surprising finding of this dissertation was that large and small MLOs 
have similar likelihoods of entering a new market. However, while large SLOs resemble 
MLOs in their likelihood of entry, small SLOs are much less likely to enter a new 
market. As much of the U.S. is supported by public sector SLOs, policies that increase 
the engagement of smaller SLOs may not only provide an important economic return for 
these organizations, but may also help them better be able to respond to the values and 
demands of their constituency. A fourth managerial implication for policy makers is that 
 104 
 
community values can influence state logic organizations in important ways. Thus, 
regulations and policy should provide consideration for the underlying values 
surrounding these organizations, including how they may promote or limit an SLOs 
entrepreneurial behavior with regards to entering a new market.  
Future Research – There are a number of opportunities for future research that would 
greatly enhance our knowledge of institutional logics, especially in terms of 
organizational and community-level logics. First, the results of my analysis suggested 
that community-level logics may not have as strong of an effect on organizational 
behavior as I previously assumed. In other words, the findings indicate that 
organizational logics interact with communities values, helping researchers better 
understand how external values can be internalized within organizations and individuals 
(Almandoz, 2014). Political ideology, including the level of conflict between ideologies, 
can and does influence organizational behavior in important ways (Delmestri, 2009). 
Future work should continue to explore how additional community logics such as 
religion or family influence both individuals and organizations (i.e.,take a multi-level 
approach). Such approaches would help us better understand which logics influence a 
variety of individual and firm-level outcomes of interest.  
Second, a promising theoretical area that remains under-explored in the 
institutional logics perspective is how logics become established and then fall away from 
prominence. In other words, we know little about how logics become instantiated within 
individuals and organizations, nor do we know if or how these logics can change over 
time. The institutional logics literature has long recognized that institutions are 
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historically contingent, meaning that their influence varies over time (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Marquis & Lee, 2013; Thornton, 2001). The importance of institutional 
orders and their influence with relation to other institutional orders thus is expected to 
vary. One possible focus of this research could build on the theoretical foundation of 
focus of attention (Ocasio, 2011). In other words, how do logics change or evolve over 
time as organizational and individual attention shifts as the result of changes in social 
views and perceptions.  
Third, there is a significant literature on logic multiplicity or logics hybridization. 
To date, however, there is little information about how logics interact or are interpreted 
by organizations participating within a PPP, and how PPPs influence entrepreneurial 
behavior. While this study found no appreciable influence on market entry behavior for 
PPPs, the sample size was limited to less than 90 of the SLOs out of the nearly 2,400 
participating in a formal PPP. Thus, future research should look at contexts where 
greater numbers are PPPs are available, which would increase statistical power. Another 
possible avenue for future research regarding PPPs is to take a qualitative or case study 
approach to build theory. Such approaches would likely greatly increase our 
understanding of how PPPs, which include formalized contractual agreements to govern 
behavior, can not only influence entrepreneurship outcomes, but other firm and 
individual-level outcomes of interest, such as firm performance, innovation, and 
organizational identification.  
For instance, while PPP’s did not appear to significantly moderate the 
relationship between organization logic and entry or risk-taking, additional exploratory 
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analyses indicated that the presence of a PPP does moderate the relationship between the 
time to recoup investment (i.e., payback period) and market entry. This finding suggests 
that organizations participating in PPP may become more focused on profit-based 
opportunities than those not participating in a PPP. The implication of this may be that 
the process of designing and writing a formal contractual partnership agreement, as well 
as the subsequent management practices involved with administering the agreement, 
help market and state logic based organizations better focus on profit based activities 
that are related to their agreed-upon strategy identified in their agreement.  
Another opportunity for future research would be to further investigate the 
findings of this dissertation, which suggest that size moderates that relationship between 
organization logic and market entry behavior. One possible explanation not explored 
here that would provide theoretical nuance to the current literature would look at how 
the availability of resources influences what logics are instantiated within organizations 
and individuals. Currently, research looking at organizational logics has assumed that 
any resource necessary to implement an organization’s preferred logic is already 
available to the organization. Future research should build on the findings of my 
dissertation by looking at how the actual extent and variety of resources possessed by an 
organization impact the logics, including the subsequent practices and beliefs, are 
internalized by a firm. 
Another opportunity for further research would be to investigate first-order 
effects of the moderators proposed in this study on the same dependent variables. For 
example, first-order models that included all first-order independent variables (i.e., PPP, 
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Size, Republican, and Power Asymmetry) were run for both dependent variables. The 
model with Entry as the dependent variable showed that even though these variables did 
not moderate the relationship between Logic and Risk, all but PPP had a significant first 
order effect (p<0.05), suggesting that constructs such as power asymmetry may operate 
independently of organizational-level logics. In other words, this indicates that there may 
not be any boundary conditions on some of these relationships.  
Finally, the finding that organizations in Democrat-led communities are less 
likely than organizations in Republican-led communities to enter the market for 
renewable power is somewhat surprising. In contexts where there is a real opportunity to 
not only generate a profit, but also to achieve substantial reductions in pollution (i.e., 
environmental benefits), one may expect that areas that vote Democratic would become 
more likely to enter the market. One possible explanation that was not considered in this 
dissertation is that there may be differential effects based on the economic prosperity of 
the community (although exploratory models confirm this explanation). Communities 
with higher incomes will likely be able to focus on protecting the environment through 
projects such as renewable energy generation more than areas that are dealing with 
pressing societal issues such as high poverty or lack of infrastructure. Future work 
should consider how differences in socio-economic resources at the community-level 
interact with other community-level factors such as political ideology to influence 
organizational-level outcomes such as new market entry and risk-taking.  
This dissertation has explored the influence that a state logic has at the 
organizational-level, with a focus on how it influences entrepreneurial actions during 
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market entry. I find that organizations based on a state logic are less likely to enter a 
market, but that they take more risk when they do enter the market. Further, I find that 
there are several organizational and community-level moderators of this relationship that 
help extend the institutional logics perspective by showing how the values in the external 
community can be internalized within the organization. Further, I show how 
organizational characteristics such as size can lead organizations to behave in ways that 
are similar to organizations based on a different logic.  
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